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Abstract
In artificial intelligence, it is important to handle and analyse inconsistency
in knowledge bases. Inconsistent pieces of information suggest questions like
“where is the inconsistency?” and “how severe is it?”. Inconsistency measures
have been proposed to tackle the latter issue, but the former seems underdevel-
oped and is the focus of this paper. Minimal inconsistent sets have been the
main tool to localise inconsistency, but we argue that they are like the exposed
part of an iceberg, failing to capture contradictions hidden under the water.
Using classical propositional logic, we develop methods to characterise when a
formula is contributing to the inconsistency in a knowledge base and when a set
of formulas can be regarded as a primitive conflict. To achieve this, we employ
an abstract consequence operation to “look beneath the water level”, general-
ising the minimal inconsistent set concept and the related free formula notion.
We apply the framework presented to the problem of measuring inconsistency
in knowledge bases, putting forward relaxed forms for two debatable postulates
for inconsistency measures. Finally, we discuss the computational complexity
issues related to the introduced concepts.
Keywords: Propositional logic, Inconsistency management, Inconsistency
analysis, Inconsistency localisation
1. Introduction
The occurrence of inconsistencies in data and knowledge is an important
issue for the application of knowledge representation and reasoning technologies
that are based on standard logics. To develop ways of dealing with an inconsis-
tent set of formulas, it is important to understand the inconsistency, analysing
its properties. Given an inconsistent knowledge base (a set of formulas), nat-
ural questions that arise are “where is the inconsistency?” and “how severe is
it?”. To answer the second question in a qualitative way, inconsistent knowledge
bases were classified by the severity of their inconsistency [17]. Recently, to nu-
merically quantify the extent to which a knowledge base is inconsistent, many
inconsistency measures have been proposed [29, 24, 25, 19, 28, 27, 20, 42, 43]. In
contrast, the first question appears quite underdeveloped, and it is the subject
of the present work.
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Inconsistency localisation can mean different things. One may want for
instance to spot which part of the language is “contaminated” by the incon-
sistency, looking for the logical variables involved in contradictions (see e.g.
[22, 25]). Alternatively, one might assign numeric inconsistency values for for-
mulas in a knowledge base, indicating the extent to which they are involved in
the inconsistency, according to a given definition (e.g. [23, 25]). In this paper,
we focus on localising the inconsistency in a knowledge base, showing how it
unfolds among the formulas1. That is, given an inconsistent knowledge base, we
are interested in discovering which subsets of formulas are contributing to the
inconsistency, being its causes, and which formulas are not involved whatsoever.
1.1. Motivation
When a knowledge base is inconsistent, it is not necessarily the case that
its inconsistency is spread over all its formulas. For example, consider the set
formed by the propositions: “Alice is a cat”, “Alice is not a cat” and “Bob
is a dog”. Even though the whole set is inconsistent, intuition tends towards
regarding the first two propositions as controversial and the third one as free
of inconsistency somehow. To capture such intuition, minimal inconsistent sets
(inconsistent sets whose all proper subsets are consistent) have been construed
as the “purest form of inconsistency” [24, 25]. Accordingly, a formula not con-
tained in any minimal inconsistent set — a free formula — has been regarded
as “uncontroversial”. As the first two propositions are already contradicting
each other, the whole base is not a minimal inconsistent set. Furthermore, the
third proposition contradicts neither the first nor the second proposition, hence
“Bob is a dog” is indeed technically free, for not being in a minimal inconsis-
tent set. Such a simple solution to the problem of localising the inconsistency
probably is the reason for the lack of a systematic investigation of this issue.
Nonetheless, the situation is more complex than might at first appear, since
minimal inconsistent sets are alike the exposed part of the iceberg, ignoring all
the inconsistency hidden under the water, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The recognition of these iceberg inconsistencies can find application in dif-
ferent areas where inconsistent pieces of information have to be dealt with. For
instance, in software engineering, requirements extraction might reveal users’
expectations that cannot hold together, calling for a method for localising the
conflicts. In data integration/fusion, as well as in belief merging, the proper
identification of the sources of information, or the agents, that are conflicting
each other allows one to narrow its attention to the focus of the problem, ignor-
ing uncontroversial data/beliefs. In formal argumentation, inconsistency can be
localised in order to show how a set of arguments is conflicting. Inconsistency
localisation may also bring important clues in fraud investigation, for instance
in the analysis of contradicting tax forms of a given taxpayer. In general, any
decision making under inconsistent information might benefit from localising the
1Note that logically closed theories are equal to the whole logical language when inconsis-
tent, hence we focus on (possibly non-closed) knowledge bases.
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Figure 1: Inconsistency as icebergs.
inconsistency. For example, a physician facing several different medical tests of
a given patient with inconsistent results might need to choose which ones should
be performed again. Example 1.1 brings a concrete situation where a decision
can be influenced by inconsistency localisation.
Example 1.1. The police is investigating a robbery on a jewellery shop that
occurred on a weekday, during working hours. The investigators have taken
testimony from all employees that were working on the day of the crime. The
witnesses’ statements include the following:
• salesperson: “I did not open the safe, and the criminals carried no guns!”
• security chief: “Only the manager or the salesperson could have opened
the safe, and the criminals carried guns.”
• manager: “I did not open the safe.”
As the police conceives the possibility of some of the employees having been
complicit, they look for contradictions among the versions given. Inconsistent
testimonies would imply some witnesses are lying, raising suspicions of complic-
ity against them. The security chief and the salesperson are clearly contradicting
each other, but is the manager involved in some contradiction? From the state-
ments above, can one infer that it is possible that the manager is lying?
To answer the questions raised in the example above, we need a tool to tell
the “uncontroversial” from the “controversial” formulas in a knowledge base,
since we are only interested in knowing whether the manager’s testimony is
involved in the inconsistency, raising suspicion that he/she lied. This can be
regarded as the relaxed form of the problem of localising inconsistency, whose
solution is a partition of the inconsistent knowledge base into “controversial”
and “uncontroversial” formulas. Free formulas are intended to encompass all
and only “uncontroversial” formulas in a knowledge base, but we shall argue
that they are not suitable for all contexts. For instance, in the example above,
3
the manager’s testimony is free (because it is not in any minimal inconsistent
set), but it also seems to contradict the others in some way.
A harder problem is identifying the atomic inconsistencies, or the primitive
conflicts, in a knowledge base and can be illustrated by the following situation:
Example 1.2. A university has hired a company to design a library manage-
ment software to be used by all its members. In order to extract the design
specifications, the company has collected requirements from the head of each
department, which include:
• Ecology: “The software should be open source, contributing to the whole
academic community.”
• Marketing: “It can’t be freely available, we need to keep our university
edge in IT systems as a differential that attracts new students.”
• Philosophy: “Both graduate and undergraduate students shall have the
same rights in the system and it must be remotely accessible.”
• Economy: “Due to their different demands, graduate students need some
privileges. If the system is to be remotely accessible, its software should
not be open source, otherwise it could be vulnerable.”
• Theology: “Department heads shall have no exclusive privileges.”
• Arts: “I have no specific requirements.”
The project manager, while reading such requirements, notes two contradictions:
one between the heads of the Ecology and Marketing departments, on whether
the software should be open source, and another between the heads of Philoso-
phy and Economy departments, about the graduate and undergraduate students
rights. The manager plans to arrange meetings with the department heads to
discuss — and maybe relax — their requirements in order to enable them to be
jointly realisable. Nevertheless, heads of departments are very busy, making it
impossible to make a single meeting with all stakeholders. The manager then
intends to schedule two separate meetings to try to resolve the contradictions:
one involving the Ecology and Marketing heads, and the other with the Philoso-
phy and Economy heads. Is this sufficient to reconcile all requirements? If each
meeting succeeds in yielding relaxed requirements that are free from contradic-
tion, will the whole set of requirements become compatible? If not, how should
the meetings be arranged to achieve that?
Within a set of controversial formulas, not every subset is essentially forming
a conflict, thus inconsistency can be further analysed. This notion of conflict
primitiveness, or inconsistency atomicity, is strongly linked to the procedure of
restoring the consistency of — or consolidate — the knowledge base. The ratio-
nale behind it is that consolidating a knowledge base is resolving its primitive
conflicts, or atomic inconsistencies. For these reasons, the atomic inconsistencies
have been characterised via minimal inconsistent sets, as removing a formula
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from each consolidates the knowledge base. However, withdrawing formulas may
be an unsuitable way of achieving consistency in some situations. In Example
1.1, that approach would lead to the loss of valuable information, since a police
investigation is not about having a consistent set of witnesses, but it is about
fully analysing what they say. Therefore, minimal inconsistent sets may fail to
spot all problematic sets of formulas in a base. For instance, while the only
two minimal inconsistent subsets in Example 1.2 are the contradictions Ecology
vs Marketing and Philosophy vs Economy, apparently Ecology, Philosophy and
Economy requirements are also conflicting.
1.2. Our Approach
In a nutshell, the problem with Examples 1.1 and 1.2 is that parts of the
propositions are conflicting, and this is not captured by minimal inconsistent
sets. If a set of inconsistent formulas is like an iceberg, we need a way to look
under the water, or “inside” the formulas. To achieve that, one can use an
arbitrary consequence operation Cn? that can return “parts” of the formulas.
Another way of seeing the issue with the aforementioned examples is considering
an underlying consolidation procedure. If the testimonies or the requirements
are to be consolidated via discarding witnesses or departments, minimal in-
consistent sets indeed encode all causes of inconsistency, and free formulas are
indeed “uncontroversial”. Nevertheless, other consolidation procedures, which
allow for formula weakening instead of withdrawal, yield different characteri-
sations of atomic inconsistency or primitive conflicts and of “uncontroversial”
formulas. Once more, a generic consequence operation Cn? can be used to
formalise these consistency restoring procedures, as we shall see.
Using a generic consequence operation Cn? to look under the water level,
we put forward methods for telling controversial from uncontroversial formulas
and characterising the atomic inconsistencies in a knowledge base, revealing the
hidden iceberg conflicts. We introduce the concepts of ?-innocuous formulas,
?-free formulas and ?-conflicts, all parameterised by an arbitrary consequence
operation Cn?, in order to generalise the free formula and minimal inconsistent
set notions.
Apart from its intrinsic interest, localising inconsistency in knowledge bases
can be useful in measuring inconsistency, to which we draw our attention in the
second part of the paper. A straightforward method to assess the inconsistency
in a knowledge base is to count its primitive conflicts. Thus, while presenting
new primitive conflict characterisations, we are implicitly defining inconsistency
measures, which will be explored.
The devising of inconsistency measures has been influenced by a set of ratio-
nality postulates proposed by Hunter and Konieczny [25]. Among these basic
requirements, the postulates of (Independence) and (Dominance) have been sub-
ject to debate [8, 27, 11]. The postulate of (Independence) is strongly related to
minimal inconsistent sets as the primitive conflict characterisation [8, 11], and
such a link may be undesirable sometimes. As to (Dominance), it fails to hold
for most syntactic inconsistency measures [27], including the one that simply
counts minimal inconsistent sets. Applying the framework here developed, we
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propose parameterising (Independence) and (Dominance) by a consequence op-
eration Cn?, yielding two spectra of properties that have the original postulates
as the strongest particular cases.
1.3. Organisation of the Paper
After fixing notation in Section 2, we show in Section 3 how minimal inconsis-
tent sets and free formulas do no exhaust the problem of localising inconsistency
in knowledge bases. In Section 4, we generalise the notion of free formula by
considering an underlying consolidation procedure based on an abstract conse-
quence operation. Section 5 explores the use of such consequence operation to
generalise minimal inconsistent sets. Related works and how they interact with
the concepts we introduce are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 presents applica-
tions of the framework we put forward to the problem of measuring inconsistency
in knowledge bases, introducing new measures and flexibilising rationality pos-
tulates. Computational complexity issues related to the introduced concepts
are discussed in Section 8.
2. Preliminaries
In this work, we deal mainly with knowledge bases formed by propositions
from classical logic. A propositional logic language is a set of formulas formed
by atomic propositions combined with logical connectives, possibly with punc-
tuation elements (parentheses). We assume a countably infinite set of symbols
X = {x1, x2, x3, . . . } corresponding to atomic propositions (atoms). Formulas
are constructed inductively with connectives (¬,∧,∨,→), atomic propositions
as usual, possibly with parentheses. The set of all these well-formed formulas
is the propositional language over X, denoted by L. Additionally, > denotes
xi∨¬xi for some xi ∈ Xn, and ⊥ denotes ¬>. A formula ϕ ∈ L is a literal if ei-
ther ϕ = xi or ϕ = ¬xi for some xi ∈ X. For any ϕ ∈ L, Lit(ϕ) denotes the set
of literals that are subformulas of ϕ. A clause is a formula in L formed by the
disjunction of literals. A knowledge base (KB) is a set Γ ⊆ L, and K is the set
of all knowledge bases. For any Γ ∈ K, Lit(Γ) denotes the set ⋃{Lit(ϕ)|ϕ ∈ Γ}.
A valuation (or truth assignment) is a function v : X → {0, 1}, where 1 and
0 denote TRUE and FALSE, respectively. Each valuation can be extended to
the whole set L following the classical semantics of the connectives, as usual. A
formula ϕ ∈ L is consistent (or satisfiable) if there is a valuation v such that
v(ϕ) = 1, when we say v satisfies ϕ. A formula ϕ ∈ L is said to be valid if ¬ϕ
is unsatisfiable. A knowledge base Γ ∈ K is consistent (satisfiable) if there is a
valuation satisfying all ϕ ∈ Γ. Deciding whether a knowledge base is satisfiable
is the Boolean satisfiability problem (SAT). The classical consequence operation
is the function Cn : K → K such that, for all Γ ∈ K and ϕ ∈ L, ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ) iff
Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is inconsistent.
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3. Minimal Inconsistent Sets and Free Formulas
The task of localising the inconsistency in a knowledge base can be split into
two subtasks, in increasing order of difficulty:
• discriminating the “controversial” formulas from the “uncontroversial”
ones;
• identifying the atomic (or primitive) conflicts.
The first subproblem can indeed be seen as a relaxed version of the second. By
identifying “controversial” formulas as those involved in some primitive conflicts
(according to a given characterisation), finding the “uncontroversial” formulas
in a knowledge base (solving the first subproblem) means finding, via set com-
plement, the union of such conflicts. Meanwhile, solving the second subtask,
identifying the primitive conflicts, leads to a solution to the first task by consid-
ering whether or not a formula is involved in a conflict. In fact, the commonest
way of localising inconsistency tackles directly the hardest problem, through
minimal inconsistent sets:
Definition 3.1 (minimal inconsistent set). A knowledge base Γ ∈ K is
a minimal inconsistent set (MIS) if Γ is inconsistent and every set Γ′ ( Γ is
consistent.
When a minimal inconsistent set ∆ is a subset of a base Γ ∈ K, we say ∆
is a minimal inconsistent subset of Γ — a MIS of Γ. The set of all MISes in a
base Γ ∈ K is denoted by MIS(Γ). A derived definition intend to capture when
a formula is “uncontroversial”, not causing the inconsistency in a base:
Definition 3.2 (free formula). A formula ϕ in a base Γ ∈ K is said to be free
in Γ if, for all ∆ ∈ MIS(Γ), ϕ /∈ ∆.
Despite the widespread employment of MISes and free formulas in order
to localise inconsistency in a knowledge base, there are situations where such
concepts are not suitable, failing to capture all causes of inconsistency and
identifying as “uncontroversial” some “controversial” formulas.
Example 3.3. Recall the situation of Example 1.1 and consider the following
atomic propositions:
• s stands for “the salesperson opened the safe”;
• m stands for “the manager opened the safe”;
• g stands for “the criminals carried guns”.
Now we can formalise the testimonies:
• salesperson: ϕ = ¬s ∧ ¬g;
• security chief: ψ = (s ∨m) ∧ g;
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Figure 2: Iceberg inconsistency in Example 3.3. Above the water line, we see the formulas in
the knowledge base, while their consequences (including themselves) are under the water. As
the salesperson suspends the belief on ¬g, the conflict below the water line becomes apparent.
• manager: θ = ¬m.
This triple of propositions forms a knowledge base Γ = {ϕ,ψ, θ}, which is clearly
inconsistent, so some people must be lying. Suppose now the investigators want
to localise the inconsistency, finding which propositions (and witnesses) are
causing the contradiction. Using minimal inconsistent sets, one can note that
MIS(Γ) = {{ϕ,ψ}}, and θ = ¬m is free. In other words, using MISes, we can
conclude that the salesperson and the security chief are contradicting each other,
but the manager’s testimony is not contributing to cause the inconsistency. Un-
der this view, the police could focus on the salesperson and the security chief
in the search for the complicit employees, for at least one is lying, ignoring the
manager. Consequently, the police could take measures to guarantee the sus-
pects do not run away, whilst doing nothing about the manager. However, note
that the salesperson’s testimony implies ¬s, while the security chief ’s entails
s ∨ m. Taking ¬s and s ∨ m, one can conclude m, contradicting the man-
ager’s statement. In practice, the investigators could meet the salesperson and
the security chief in order to discuss whether or not the criminals carried guns.
The security could point out that there were pistols held in their pockets and
the salesperson could admit the possibility of not having noticed them. As the
salesperson suspends such judgement, his/her testimony becomes ϕ′ = ¬s. The
updated knowledge base encoding the information given by the witnesses would
be Γ′ = {ϕ′, ψ, θ}, which is a MIS (see Figure 2). As a conclusion, ϕ′ and ψ
could be true, with both the salesperson and the security chief having always been
telling the truth about the safe opening, implying the manager was lying — but
he/she could then be lying on a nice beach far away (pun intended).
From the example above, we can conclude that, under some circumstances,
the concept of free formula may misguide the localisation of “uncontroversial”
pieces of information in a knowledge base. Dually, we could say that not every
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“controversial” formula takes part in a minimal inconsistent set. Even in cases
where minimal inconsistent sets capture all controversial formulas, they might
not properly identify which sets of formulas are actually conflicting, as the
example below indicates.
Example 3.4. Back to Example 1.2, let us formalise the system requirements
suggested by the heads of the departments via the following atomic propositions:
• o stands for “the software is open source”;
• g stands for “graduate students have more rights than undergraduate stu-
dents”;
• r stands for “the system can be remotely accessed”;
• h stands for “heads of departments have exclusive privileges”.
Now we can formalise the requirements given by the heads:
• Ecology: o;
• Marketing: ¬o;
• Philosophy: ¬g ∧ r;
• Economy: g ∧ (r → ¬o);
• Theology: ¬h;
• Arts: >.
The set of these six propositions forms the knowledge base Γ = {o,¬o,¬g∧r, g∧
(r → ¬o),¬h,>} in K. The only minimal inconsistent sets in Γ are ∆ = {o,¬o}
and Ψ = {¬g ∧ r, g ∧ (r → ¬o)}, thus ¬h and > are the only free formulas
in Γ. Using MISes to identify the conflicting requirements, it seems that the
project manager could safely schedule a meeting between Ecology and Marketing
heads and another meeting with Philosophy and Economy heads to solve the
contradictions, reconciling the requirements. Imagine these meetings happen and
consider the following scenario. The Ecology and the Marketing heads gather
along with the project manager, and the Marketing head is convinced to accept
the possibility that the software could be open source, updating its requirement
to ¬o ∨ o 2. The Philosophy head persuades the Economy head to the idea that
graduate students do not need special rights, so the latter’s requirement is relaxed
to r → ¬o. Updating the whole set of requirements, we have the knowledge base
Γ1 = {o,¬o ∨ o,¬g ∧ r, r → ¬o,¬h,>}. Note that {o,¬g ∧ r, r → ¬o} ⊆ Γ1 is
a MIS, so Γ1 is inconsistent. That is, even though each meeting led to relaxed,
compatible requirements, the whole set of requirements is still inconsistent. This
points to a conflict between the heads of Ecology, Philosophy and Economy that
was not captured by minimal inconsistent sets (see Figure 3).
2We avoid using > here to enable both these requirements and the Arts heads’ to be
different elements in the base.
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Figure 3: Iceberg inconsistency in Example 3.4. Above the water line, we see the formulas
in the knowledge base, while their consequences (including themselves) are under the water.
When the Economy head gives up his requirement on special rights for graduate students, the
conflict under the water is revealed.
These examples motivate our quest for new tools for localising inconsistency
in a knowledge base. We are interested in alternative ways of both telling the
“uncontroversial” formulas from the “controversial” ones and identifying the
primitive conflicts within the latter. Every definition of primitive conflict yields
a notion of “uncontroversial” formulas as being those not involved in a conflict.
Nevertheless, it is in principle possible to define the latter without introducing
the former, solving only the problem of localising the controversial formulas,
but not discriminating them into atomic inconsistencies. For the sake of presen-
tation, we follow this path, firstly looking independently for refinements of the
free formula concept to then investigate characterisation of conflicts afterwards.
4. Refining the Notion of Free Formulas
Before proceeding to develop the free formula concept refinement, we take a
quick look at an existing proposal. A stronger form of free formula has already
been suggested in the literature. Hunter and Konieczny [25] defined a safe for-
mula as a consistent one whose atomic propositions are disjoint from those in the
rest of the base. The intuition is that a safe formula cannot be “controversial”
in a base since its atomic propositions are not used in other formulas in the base,
thus it is logically independent in some sense. Although safe formulas are easily
recognisable, we expect them to be rare in practice, due to the natural logical
dependencies among propositions within a knowledge base. Furthermore, safe
formulas are a primitive concept, not derived from a characterisation of atomic
inconsistencies – as free formulas are derived from MISes. Hence, the problem
of localising inconsistency would only partially be solved, with the set of safe
formulas being the “uncontroversial” ones, but without means to discriminate
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the conflicts within the possibly “controversial” part. More importantly, not
every non-safe formula seems to be “controversial”: consider for instance x1 in
the knowledge base {x1, x1 ∧ x2,¬x2}. That is, the safe formula concept is too
conservative, failing to spot most “uncontroversial” formulas. We are looking
for a weaker, more useful notion of “uncontroversial” formulas, between safe and
free, for which the “controversial” formulas could indeed be regarded as such –
for instance, via some primitive conflict characterisation.
A way of understanding what is happening in Example 3.3 is via the way
the conflict between the salesperson and the security chief was solved. Once
the contradiction has been spotted, one does not need to completely ignore one
of the witnesses, because he/she was lying, but consistency can be achieved by
discarding only part of some testimony. In Example 1.1, the salesperson could
have misled, by not noticing the guns, and his/her statement about not having
opened the safe (¬s) could still be believed. This connection between a conflict
characterisation and a procedure to restore consistency is clear in the case of
MISes and free formulas.
The concept of free formula is based on the idea that minimal inconsistent
sets are the causes of inconsistencies. Such an idea can be understood by noting
that the classical way of handling inconsistency is through ruling out formu-
las, as Reiter proposed in his diagnosis problem [36] and as the standard AGM
paradigm of belief revision – named after Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson
[1] – defines base contraction (see [21] for a general view of the AGM paradigm).
Reiter’s hitting sets technique views a repair of some inconsistency set of for-
mulas as giving up of at least one element from each minimal inconsistent set.
For such a repair to be minimal, no free formula should be discarded. In the
AGM paradigm, the consolidation process of a belief base can be interpreted as
the contraction of ⊥, the contradiction. The inclusion postulate claims that the
result of a contraction is a subset of the belief base in question, and the success
postulate states that, while contracting by ⊥, the result should be consistent.
That is, to perform a consolidation in the AGM framework, we can only discard
formulas, and again focus on the MISes if we want to minimally do so. Indeed,
the relevance postulate forces the contraction of ⊥ to contain all free formulas
of the base. This is due to the fact that free formulas are consistent with any
consistent subset of the knowledge base, which is a consolidation in the AGM
theory:
Definition 4.1 (AGM-consolidation). Let Γ be a knowledge base in K. An
AGM-consolidation of Γ is any consistent subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ.
Using AGM-consolidations, free formulas could be alternatively defined 3.
Proposition 4.2. Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and a formula ϕ ∈ Γ. ϕ
is free in Γ iff, for any AGM-consolidation Γ′ of Γ, Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
The result above provides a new way of equivalently defining a free formula
3Ideas and results similar to this section’s were already developed for probabilistic logic [11].
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without mentioning minimal inconsistent sets, but using AGM-consolidations.
If other forms of restoring consistency are conceived, different notions of “un-
controversial” formulas might arise.
While consolidating a knowledge base, we could preserve part of the informa-
tion conveyed by the formulas being discarded, instead of completely forgetting
them. Hence, we conceive more general consolidation procedures than the one
employed by Reiter and the AGM framework. We are interested in consolidation
procedures that allow for formulas being weakened, not only deleted. Different
methods can be employed to weaken a formula: discarding conjuncts or adding
disjuncts [18], employing prime implicates [27], applying dilation [19], etc. To
generally encompass all these procedures, we employ an arbitrary consequence
operation Cn? : K → K. Some properties a consequence operation can enjoy
are listed in the following:
Definition 4.3. Consider arbitrary bases Γ,∆ ∈ K, an arbitrary formula ϕ ∈ L
and a Cn? : K→ K. Cn? satisfies
• Monotonicity if Γ ⊆ ∆ implies Cn?(Γ) ⊆ Cn?(∆);
• Idempotence if Cn?(Cn?(Γ)) ⊆ Cn?(Γ);
• Inclusion if Γ ⊆ Cn?(Γ);
• (Strict) Subclassicality if Cn?(Γ) ⊆ Cn(Γ) (Cn?(Γ) ( Cn(Γ));
• Modularity if Cn?(Γ) = ⋃{Cn?({ϕ})|ϕ ∈ Γ}.
If Cn? satisfies monotonicity, inclusion and idempotence, we say it is Tarskian
[40]. For instance, the classical consequence operation Cn is Tarskian, but not
modular.
Using a consequence operation with some properties, we can define a more
general sort of consolidation operation that allows some, but not all conse-
quences of a knowledge base to be present in its consolidation, following ideas
from [39] and [12].
Definition 4.4 (?-consolidation). Let Γ be a knowledge base in K and Cn?
be a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation. A ?-consolidation of Γ is
any consistent set Γ′ ⊆ Cn?(Γ).
Of course not all subclassical, Tarskian consequence operations yields inter-
esting ?-consolidation definitions. For instance, using the classical consequence
operation Cn, an inconsistent Γ ∈ K would imply Cn(Γ) = L, and any consis-
tent knowledge base could be the ?-consolidation of Γ. That is why we focus on
strictly subclassical Cn?.
If we want to restrict ?-consolidations to contain only formulas that are
weaker than those in the original knowledge base, Cn? must be modular. In
this case, the consequence operation is dual to a (weakening) relation on pairs
of formulas:
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Definition 4.5 (modular consequence relation `?). For a given modular
consequence operation Cn? : K→ K, `?⊆ L×L is such that, for every ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
〈ϕ,ψ〉 ∈ `? (denoted by ϕ `? ψ) iff ψ ∈ Cn?({ϕ}). We say `? is a modular
consequence relation.
We use ` to denote the classical entailment relation between formulas ϕ,ψ ∈
L: ϕ ` ψ iff ψ ∈ Cn({ϕ}). Note that any given modular consequence relation
`?⊆ L × L also uniquely determines a modular consequence operation Cn?
via Cn?({ϕ}) = {ψ ∈ L|ϕ `? ψ} and Cn?(Γ) = ⋃{Cn?({ϕ})|ϕ ∈ Γ}. That
is, a given modular consequence operation Cn? defines a modular consequence
relation `? that in turn uniquely characterises Cn?. Due to this bijection, we
sometimes use `? to refer to the corresponding modular Cn?.
Throughout the paper, Cn? will be instantiated often as one of the following
modular consequence operations:
Definition 4.6. CnId : K → K, Cn∧ : K → K, Cn∧2 : K → K and Cnmod :
K→ K are modular consequence operators, defined, for any ϕ ∈ L, as:
• CnId({ϕ}) = {ϕ};
• Cn∧({ϕ}) = {ψ | ϕ = ψ,ϕ = ψ ∧ γ, ϕ = θ ∧ ψ or ϕ = θ ∧ ψ ∧ γ};
• Cn∧2 ({ϕ}) = {ψ ∈ Cn∧({ϕ}) | {ψ} = Cn∧({ψ})};
• Cnmod({ϕ}) = Cn({ϕ}).
The consequence operation CnId is simply an identity function. Informally,
ψ ∈ Cn∧{ϕ} if ψ is a conjunct of ϕ. For instance, if Γ = {x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3},
Cn∧(Γ) = {x1, x2, x3, x1 ∧ x2, x2 ∧ x3, x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3}. In contrast, Cn∧2 considers
only the smallest conjuncts, and Cn∧2 (Γ) = Γ ∪ {x1, x2, x3}. Also note that
Cnmod = Cn? implies `?= `, so Cnmod is a modular version of the classical
consequence operation Cn. From their definition, one can see that CnId, Cn∧,
Cn∧2 and Cn
mod are subclassical and Tarskian.
Example 4.7. Back to Example 3.3, consider the knowledge base ∆ = {¬s ∧
¬g, (s ∨ m) ∧ g}, which encodes the testimonies given by the salesperson and
the security chief. The knowledge base ∆′ = {¬s, (s ∨m) ∧ g} can be seen as a
?-consolidation of ∆ if Cn? = Cn∧.
Using these concepts, a new notion of “uncontroversial” formula arises:
Definition 4.8 (innocuous formula). Let Γ be a knowledge base in K. A
formula ϕ ∈ Γ is ?-innocuous in Γ if, for every ?-consolidation ∆ of Γ, ∆ ∪ {ϕ}
is consistent.
Example 4.9. Recall from Example 3.3 that the knowledge base ∆ = {¬s ∧
¬g, (s ∨ m) ∧ g} is the only MIS in Γ = ∆ ∪ {¬m}, thus θ = ¬m is free in
Γ. Nevertheless, taking Cn? = Cn∧, we have that ∆′ = {¬s, (s ∨m) ∧ g} is a
?-consolidation of Γ, and ∆′ ∪ {θ} = {¬s, (s∨m)∧ g,¬m} is inconsistent, so θ
is not ?-innocuous.
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The reason why ?-innocuous formulas can be taken as uncontroversial is that
one can ignore them while ?-consolidating a knowledge base. Given an inconsis-
tent knowledge base Γ, to AGM-consolidate it — discarding formulas —, one can
focus on the non-free part of the base, withdrawing formulas until consistency is
reached, and then concatenate the free formulas again, due to Proposition 4.2.
Using ?-consolidation instead of AGM-consolidation, ?-innocuous formulas can
be ignored (or bypassed), as they can be consistently added in the end:
Proposition 4.10. Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K → K, a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and a ∆ ⊆ Γ that contains only
formulas that are ?-innoucuous in Γ. If Ψ′ is a ?-consolidation of Ψ = Γ \∆,
then Ψ′ ∪∆ is a ?-consolidation of Γ.
Since ?-consolidations are AGM-consolidations, we can prove:
Proposition 4.11. Let Γ be a knowledge base in K. If a formula ϕ ∈ Γ is
?-innocuous in Γ, then ϕ is free in Γ.
The concept of ?-innocuous formula is parameterised by the entailment re-
lation Cn?, which has two extreme instances, due to monotonicity and subclas-
sicality:
• Cn? = CnId and ?-consolidations are AGM-consolidations;
• Cn? = Cn, and for any inconsistent Γ ∈ K, any consistent ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) =
L is a ?-consolidation.
In the first case, Cn? is the identity function, and ?-innocuous formulas are
equal to free formulas, due to the characterisation given by Proposition 4.2. In
the second case, no falsifiable (i.e., non-valid) formula ϕ can be ?-innocuous in
an inconsistent Γ, for {¬ϕ} ⊆ Cn(Γ) is a ?-consolidation. Conversely, for any
subclassical Cn?, every valid formula is ?-innocuous, for it is consistent with
any ?-consolidation. Hence, in the second case, the ?-innocuous formulas in any
inconsistent knowledge base are exactly its tautologies, a rather conservative
definition.
When we limit our attention to modular Cn?, two extreme cases arise as well.
The weakest modular consequence operation is Cn? = CnId, just discussed
above. Since we assume subclassicalility, the strongest modular consequence
operation is Cn? = Cnmod, because `?= `. Although Cnmod is weaker than
the classical consequence operation Cn, it can also yield undesired consequences:
Example 4.12. Recall the scenario of Example 3.4, where Γ = {o,¬o,¬g ∧
r, g∧ (r → ¬o),¬h,>} is the base containing the original requirements. Suppose
the Marketing head had weakened his requirement (¬o) to ¬o ∨ o as before, but
the second meeting had taken a different course, as follows. Both department
heads (Philosophy and Economy) are very reluctant to weaken their requirements
(¬g ∧ r and g ∧ (r → ¬o), respectively). In order to end the conflict, they
find a solution that pleases both: or their original requirements have to be met,
or department heads must have exclusive rights in the system. That is, the
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water line
¬g ∧ r g ∧ (r → ¬o)
(¬g ∧ r) ∨ h (g ∧ (r → ¬o)) ∨ h ¬h
Minimal Inconsistent Sets
hidden conflicts
Figure 4: Iceberg Inconsistency in Example 4.12. Above the water line, we see the formulas
in the knowledge base, while their consequences (including themselves) are under the water.
The Philosophy and the Economy heads weaken their requirements in a way that they conflict
with the requirement of the Theology head.
Philosophy head’s new requirement is (¬g ∧ r) ∨ h, and the Economy head’s is
(g∧(r → ¬o))∨h. Now, the knowledge base containing the updated requirements
is Γ2 = {o,¬o ∨ o, (¬g ∧ r) ∨ h, (g ∧ (r → ¬o)) ∨ h,¬h,>}. It happens that
{(¬g ∧ r) ∨ h, (g ∧ (r → ¬o)) ∨ h,¬h} ⊆ Γ2 is a MIS, and Γ2 is inconsistent.
Note that each head’s new requirement is a logical consequence of his/her old
one. Thus, considering Cn? = Cnmod, Ψ = {o,¬o ∨ o,¬g ∧ r ∨ h, (g ∧ (r →
¬o)) ∨ h,>} ⊆ Cn?(Γ) is consistent and is a ?-consolidation of Γ. Hence, as
Ψ ∪ {¬h} = Γ2 is inconsistent, ¬h is not ?-innocuous in Γ (see Figure 4).
Nonetheless, it is somewhat against the intuition that the requirement of the
head of the Theology department be “controversial”, since it is the only one
about head’s privileges — it is safe. The problem is that such a Cn? is too
strong, allowing the department heads to weaken their requirements by including
arbitrary alternative possibilities, not related to their original ones.
In fact, the strange situation in the example above can be generalised, show-
ing that allowing any classical consequences of each formula in a ?-consolidation
yields a trivial notion of ?-innocuous formula.
Theorem 4.13. Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod.
Given an inconsistent Γ ∈ K, a formula ϕ ∈ Γ is ?-innocuous in Γ iff ϕ is valid.
Since the notion of free formula has been shown to be sometimes unsuitable
to identify the “uncontroversial” elements in a knowledge base, we put forward
the more general notion of ?-innocuous formula, which is parameterised by a
consequence relation Cn?. The intuition behind “uncontroversial” here is based
on an underlying consolidation procedure. The choice of a method to restore
the consistency of a knowledge base will yield the definition of its ?-innocuous
formulas, which can be bypassed (in the sense of Proposition 4.10) during the
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consolidation procedure. Although this new concept can in a sense tell “uncon-
troversial” formulas from the “controversial” ones, it cannot identify the atomic
inconsistencies, or the primitive conflicts, in the latter. To achieve that, we
generalise the notion of minimal inconsistent subsets.
5. Refining the Notion of Minimal Inconsistent Sets
The question of where is the inconsistency in a knowledge base is only par-
tially answered by the non-?-innocuous formulas. Even though these formulas
are involved in the inconsistency somehow, we cannot still tell which subsets are
producing the inconsistency or which are the primitive conflicts. Note that the
union of minimal inconsistent sets is the complement of the set of free formulas
in a knowledge base, so all (and only) non-free formulas can be assigned to the
MISes that contains them. In other words, a formula is said to be “uncontro-
versial” (in some sense) if it belongs to no atomic inconsistency, understood as
a MIS. Preferably, we would like to define a primitive conflict in such a way
that a formula is ?-innocuous iff it is not involved in such a conflict. Further-
more, we expect that a conflict be an inconsistent subset of the base. We could
artificially define a conflict that is the set containing all formulas that are not
?-innocuous in a knowledge base. Even though such a set could be proven to be
always inconsistent when not empty (in inconsistent bases), it would lack the
atomicity we are looking for. Such a set would be analogous to the union of all
minimal inconsistent sets, but we search for a more fundamental, atomic notion
of conflict. As modular consequence operations allow a straightforward conflict
characterization, we first investigate them before the general case.
5.1. Modular Consequence Operations
In order to derive a method for characterising primitive conflicts, we can
recall Example 3.4, where Γ = {o,¬o,¬g ∧ r, g ∧ (r → ¬o),¬h,>}. A way
of grasping the hidden inconsistencies in Γ is by noticing how the parts of
the requirements are conflicting. The fact that a formula does not belong to
a minimal inconsistent subset of a knowledge base does not mean that such a
formula cannot contradict parts of the formulas in that MIS. What happens with
the knowledge base Γ is that a part of each formula in {o,¬g∧r, g∧(r → ¬o)} is
essentially involved in a conflict, forming the MIS {o,¬g ∧ r, r → ¬o}. In other
words, even though o is not in the MIS {¬g ∧ r, g ∧ (r → ¬o)}, it is essentially
involved in an inconsistency with the subformulas ¬g ∧ r and r → ¬o. A
natural idea for characterising conflicts is thus to inspect “inside” the formulas,
searching for “hidden” minimal inconsistent sets.
To look at the “parts” of a formula, we can employ an arbitrary relation
`?: L×L, which corresponds to a modular consequence operation Cn? : K→ K.
Once more, we require that Cn? be Tarskian and subclassical. As a consequence,
when we look “inside” a formula, we can never see logically stronger formulas,
but we can always see the formula itself. For a given Cn?, the set Cn?(Γ)
contains all “parts” of the formulas, so one can look at the knowledge bases in
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MIS(Cn?(Γ)) to find the formulas that have “parts”4 essentially forming a con-
flict. Now we can generalise the concept of minimal inconsistent set, considering
a given modular Cn? and the corresponding `?:
Definition 5.1 (?-weakening). Consider a modular subclassical Tarskian con-
sequence operation Cn? : K→ K. A knowledge base ∆ is a ?-weakening of Γ if
there is a surjective function f : ∆→ Γ such that f(ψ) `? ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆.
Definition 5.2 (?-conflict). A knowledge base Γ is a ?-conflict if it has a
?-weakening ∆ that is a minimal inconsistent set.
Intuitively, for a Γ to be a ?-conflict, each formula ϕ ∈ Γ must have at
least one “part” involved in a conflict ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)); and the fact that the
function f in the definition above is surjective guarantees that. Furthermore, f
being a function means that each ψ ∈ ∆ corresponds to exactly one ϕ ∈ Γ. As
f is not required to be injective, the same formula ϕ ∈ Γ may contribute more
than one “part” to form the MIS.
Example 5.3. Let Cn? be the modular, subclassical, Tarskian consequence op-
eration Cn∧. Consider the knowledge base Γ = {x1, x1 ∧ x1,¬x1} in K. Note
that ∆ = {x1,¬x1} is in MIS(Cn?(Γ)). Even though ¬x1 `? ¬x1, x1 ∧x1 `? x1
and x1 `? x1, this does not entail that Γ is a ?-conflict, for there is no surjective
function f : ∆ → Γ. In other words, x1 ∈ ∆ can count as a “part” of either
x1 ∈ Γ or x1 ∧ x1 ∈ Γ, but not both.
Now let Cn? be the modular, subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn∧2 , which breaks formulas into their smallest conjuncts. Consider the knowl-
edge base Γ = {x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3, (x1 → x4) ∧ ¬x3, x2 → ¬x4} in K. We have that
∆ = {x1, x2, (x1 → x4), x2 → ¬x4} is a minimal inconsistent subset of Cn?(Γ).
We can construct a surjective function f : ∆ → Γ, defined as f(x1) = f(x2) =
x1∧x2∧x3, f(x1 → x4) = (x1 → x4)∧¬x3 and f(x2 → ¬x4) = x2 → ¬x4, such
that f(ψ) `? ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆; therefore, Γ is a ?-conflict. Note that x1 ∧x2 ∧x3
contributes two parts in the conflict ∆.
Due to the properties required of the modular Cn?, we have:
Proposition 5.4. Consider a modular subclassical Tarskian consequence oper-
ation Cn? : K→ K. If a Γ ∈ K is a minimal inconsistent set, Γ is a ?-conflict.
Proposition 5.5. Consider a modular subclassical Tarskian consequence oper-
ation Cn? : K→ K. If a Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict, it is inconsistent.
Example 5.6. Recall from Example 4.9 that the knowledge base ∆ = {¬s ∧
¬g, (s ∨ m) ∧ g} is the only MIS in Γ = ∆ ∪ {¬m}. Therefore, ∆ is also
a ?-conflict, by Proposition 5.4. Nevertheless, taking Cn? = Cn∧, the base
Γ′ = {¬s, (s∨m)∧g,¬m} is in MIS(Cn?(Γ)). As each formula in Γ contributes
one formula in Γ′, Γ′ is a ?-weakening of Γ. Therefore, Γ is a ?-conflict.
4We refrain from using “subformula”, as by “part” we mean a more general, semantic
notion. For example, ¬x1 could be regarded as a “part” of x1 → x2 ∧ ¬x2, although it is not
a subformula.
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Example 5.7. Back to Example 3.4, consider the knowledge base Γ = {o,¬o,¬g∧
r, g ∧ (r → ¬o),¬h,>} in K. Remember that the only minimal inconsistent sets
in Γ are ∆ = {o,¬o} and Ψ = {¬g ∧ r, g ∧ (r → ¬o)} and that ¬h and > are
the only free formulas in Γ. Depending on how we look “inside” formulas, we
have different conflicts. For instance, the following two scenarios correspond to
Examples 3.4 and 4.12, repectively:
• Scenario I: Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cn∧.
Note that {o,¬g∧r, r → ¬o} is a MIS and a ?-weakening of Φ1 = {o,¬g∧
r, g∧(r → ¬o)}, which is a ?-conflict. Nevertheless, Φ2 = {¬g∧r, g∧(r →
¬o),¬h} has no ?-weakening that is a MIS, so it is not a ?-conflict.
• Scenario II: Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod.
Note that {(¬g ∧ r) ∨ h, (r → ¬o) ∨ h,¬h} is a MIS and a ?-weakening of
Φ2 = {¬g ∧ r, g ∧ (r → ¬o),¬h}, which is a ?-conflict.
As the example above shows, different modular Cn? may yield different
notions of ?-conflict. This new definition of conflict also has two extreme cases
that arise from the choice of `? (or the modular Cn?). If Cn? = CnId, then
we are not looking strictly “inside” the formulas, and ?-conflicts are MISes, for
Γ = Cn?(Γ). At the other end, when Cn? = Cnmod (`?= `), we obtain a ?-
conflict notion that is too general, thus not interesting, as hinted in the second
scenario of Example 5.7. Consider the following example:
Example 5.8. Let Γ = {x1,¬x1, x1∧x1} be a knowledge base in K and consider
the consequence operation Cn? = Cn∧. We want to prove that Γ is a ?-conflict,
by showing a ?-weakening that is a MIS. Note that {x1,¬x1} ( Γ is already
MIS. We can try to employ the strategy from the second scenario of Example
5.7, adding the disjunct “∨¬(x1 ∧ x1)” to the first two formulas in Γ, as “∨h”
was added to the requirements of the Philosophy and the Economy heads. Doing
so, we have the ?-weakening {x1 ∨¬(x1 ∧ x1),¬x1 ∨¬(x1 ∧ x1), x1 ∧ x1}, which
is not a MIS, for the last two formulas are already contradicting each other.
Nevertheless, we can apply a more general technique to show a ?-weakening of
Γ that is indeed a MIS. Firstly, we need |Γ| = 3 “disjoint” formulas that are
not related to the formulas in Γ. We employ atomic propositions not occurring
in Γ, x2, x3, x4, to form them. Consider the following formulas in L: ψ1 =
x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ ¬x4, ψ2 = ¬x2 ∧ x3 ∧ ¬x4 and ψ3 = ¬x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ x4. Note that each
valuation satisfies at most one of these formulas. Now, let ϕ1, ϕ2 and ϕ3 denote
x1, ¬x1 and x1 ∧ x1, respectively, so that Γ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3}. Then, consider the
formulas:
ϕ′1 = ϕ1 ∨ (ψ2 ∧ ¬ϕ2) ∨ (ψ3 ∧ ¬ϕ3)
ϕ′2 = ϕ2 ∨ (ψ1 ∧ ¬ϕ1) ∨ (ψ3 ∧ ¬ϕ3)
ϕ′3 = ϕ3 ∨ (ψ1 ∧ ¬ϕ1) ∨ (ψ2 ∧ ¬ϕ2)
For instance, ϕ′1 = (x1∨¬x2∧x3∧¬x4)∧¬(¬x1)∨(¬x2∧¬x3∧x4)∧¬(x1∧x1).
Note that, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, ϕi ` ϕ′i. Therefore, Γ′ = {ϕ′1, ϕ′2, ϕ′3} is a ?-
weakening of Γ. To prove that Γ′ is a MIS, consider its proper subset ∆1 =
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Γ′ \ {ϕ′1} = {ϕ′2, ϕ′3}. Both ϕ′2 and ϕ′3 have ψ1 ∧ ¬ϕ1 = (x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ ¬x4) ∧
¬x1 as a disjunct. Since this formula is satisfiable, ∆1 is consistent. Similar
reasoning applies to both ∆2 = Γ
′ \ {ϕ′2} and ∆3 = Γ′ \ {ϕ′3}. To see that
Γ′ is a inconsistent, suppose it is satisfied by a given valuation v. Since Γ is
inconsistent, v(ϕi) = 0 for some ϕi; say v(ϕ2) = 0. As v satisfies Γ
′, it follows
that v(ϕ′2) = 1, thus v(ψ1 ∧ ¬ϕ1) = 1 or v(ψ3 ∧ ¬ϕ3) = 1. If v(ψ1 ∧ ¬ϕ1) = 1,
then v(x2) = 1 and v(ψ2) = v(ψ3) = 0 and, for v(ϕ1) = 0, v(ϕ
′
1) = 0, a
contradiction. If v(ψ3 ∧ ¬ϕ3) = 1, a contradiction would follow in the same
manner.
To characterise the ?-conflicts derived from `?= `, we need the following
intermediate result, which generalises the example above:
Lemma 5.9. Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod. Ev-
ery finite, inconsistent Γ ∈ K that does not contain valid formulas has a ?-
weakening that is a MIS.
Theorem 5.10. Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod.
Any finite knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict iff it is inconsistent and it does
not contain valid formulas.
As the concept of minimal inconsistent set induces the definition of “uncon-
troversial” formulas (i.e., the free formulas), we can also characterise “uncon-
troversial” formulas using ?-conflicts, which would contain the “controversial”
ones. Considering Examples 4.9 and 5.6, we note that θ is not ?-innocuous in
Γ, which is a ?-conflict. Additionally, Theorems 4.13 and 5.10 also point to
such duality, as does the observation that ?-conflicts are MISes for the same
Cn? = CnId that collapses ?-innocuous and free formulas. Indeed, ?-conflicts
could be used to define ?-innocuous formulas:
Theorem 5.11. Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and a modular Cn? : K→ K.
A formula ϕ ∈ Γ is ?-innocuous in Γ iff it is in no ?-conflict of Γ.
The result above shows that, given a modular consequence operation Cn?,
the formulas in a knowledge base Γ can be split into two groups: the formulas
involved in some ?-conflict; and the ?-innocuous formulas, which are consistent
with any ?-consolidation Γ′ ∈ Cn?(Γ). As a consequence, due to Proposition
4.10, while ?-consolidating a knowledge base, one can focus on the formulas
involved in the ?-conflicts, ignoring ?-innocuous formulas, in the same way that
AGM-consolidation can focus on the union of the MISes, ignoring free formulas:
When we force a ?-consolidation to be a ?-weakening, where consistency is
restored by weakening each formula, the analogy between MISes and ?-conflicts
is more evident. To consolidate via withdrawal of formulas, it suffices to discard
at least one formula of each MIS, so consolidating each MIS implies consolidating
the whole knowledge base. Similarly, a ?-weakening solving each ?-conflict ?-
consolidates the whole base:
Proposition 5.12. Suppose Γ′ ∈ K is a ?-weakening of Γ ∈ K. If, for each
?-conflict ∆ ⊆ Γ, all ?-weakenings ∆′ ⊆ Γ′ of ∆ are consistent, then Γ′ is a
?-consolidation of Γ.
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For a modular consequence operation Cn?, the introduced concept of ?-
conflict holds several desirable properties, being a plausible way of characterising
primitive conflicts. For instance, every ?-conflict is an inconsistent knowledge
base, and every inconsistent base contains a ?-conflict. As a consequence, the
?-conflict concept generalises the notion of a minimal inconsistent set. Fur-
thermore, ?-conflicts dually define ?-innocuous formulas, which can be ignored
while ?-consolidating a base, and capture the intuition that parts of formulas
are conflicting. Now we turn our attention to a general, possibly non-modular
Cn?, looking for a conflict characterisation with the same desirable properties.
5.2. General Consequence Operations
When we consider a possibly non-modular consequence operation, the deriva-
tion of a conflict characterisation is not straightforward. For modular Cn?, a
?-conflict was defined via taking some “part” of each formula in a base Γ ∈ K
to form a minimal inconsistent set, using a relation `? intended to capture
the “parts” of formulas. In the general case, a conflict can be formed not only
through weakening each formula, but also using consequences of sets of formulas,
so ?-weakenings are not sufficient to grasp which conflicts can be derived from
the base. To exemplify this, we define a non-modular consequence operation:
Definition 5.13. Cn→ : K→ K is such that, for all Γ ∈ K, Cn→(Γ) is defined
as the smallest set satisfying:
• Γ ⊆ Cn→(Γ) and
• {ϕ | ψ,ψ → ϕ ∈ Cn∧(Cn→(Γ))} ⊆ Cn→(Γ).
One can think of Cn→(Γ) as the result of starting with the formulas in
Γ and recursively applying modus ponens to their conjuncts. For example, if
Γ = {x1 ∧ (x2 → x3), x2 ∧ (x3 → x4)}, Cn→(Γ) = Γ ∪ {x3, x4}, but note that
x2, x2 → x3, x3 → x4 /∈ Cn→(Γ). From its definition, one can see that Cn→ is
subclassical and Tarskian.
Example 5.14. Consider the knowledge base Γ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ3, ϕ4}, with ϕ1 =
x1, ϕ2 = x1 → x2, ϕ3 = x1 ∧ (x2 → x3) and ϕ4 = ¬x3, and the consequence
operation Cn? = Cn→. The only two MISes of Cn?(Γ) are Ψ = {x1 → x2, x1 ∧
(x2 → x3),¬x3} (which is also a MIS of Γ) and ∆ = {x2, x1 ∧ (x2 → x3),¬x3}.
Note that ∆ is not a ?-weakening of Γ, for no formula ?-implies x2 on its own.
To ?-consolidate a base Γ ∈ K, one can compute its closure Cn?(Γ) and
then discard formulas to construct a consistent Γ′ ⊆ Cn?(Γ). That is, a ?-
consolidation of Γ is an AGM-consolidation of Cn?(Γ) (see [39, 12] for more
on this). Therefore, to ?-consolidate Γ, one can focus on the MISes in Cn?(Γ),
withdrawing at least one formula from each one of them. The next result show
the relation between ?-innocuous formulas and the MISes in the closure Cn?(Γ):
Proposition 5.15. A formula ϕ is ?-innocuous in a base Γ ∈ K iff, for all
∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)), ϕ 6∈ ∆.
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Consequently, to perform a ?-consolidation, the conflicts that really matter
are in MIS(Cn?(Γ)). However, these conflicts are not generally in the base
Γ, where we in fact want to localise the inconsistency. Following the iceberg
analogy, the conflicts in MIS(Cn?(Γ)) are those under the water line in Figures
2, 3 and 4. We need somehow to project those conflicts onto the knowledge
base, finding the formulas in the base responsible for them. When the hidden
conflict is simply a ?-weakening, as in the situations illustrated in Figures 2, 3
and 4, such projection is trivial, for each formula under the water line is derived
from a single formula in the knowledge base. In constrast, with non-modular
consequence operations, a set of formulas may be needed to derive each element
in the hidden conflict, as it happens with x2 in Example 5.14. Thus, given a
∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)), we look for the premises in Γ involved in the derivation
of each formula in ∆ in order to project the conflict onto the knowledge base.
We would like the subset of the base onto which the conflict is projected to be
inconsistent, and such projection should provide a concept that has ?-conflict,
for modular Cn?, as a particular case.
For a knowledge base Γ ∈ K, consider a ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) and a Ψ ⊆ Γ.
In the modular case, a surjective function f : ∆ → Ψ from the ?-weakening
definition can be seen as linking each ψ ∈ ∆ to a minimal set of premises
{f(ψ)} entailing it, which will be a singleton. As the range of f is Ψ ⊆ Γ, it is
somehow projecting the conflict ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) into the subset Ψ ⊆ Γ. In
the general case, for Ψ to be projection of ∆, we need a function that links each
ψ ∈ ∆ to a general subset (not necessarily a singleton) of Ψ implying it, thus
we employ an f : ∆ → 2Ψ. To avoid blaming “innocent” formulas, we require
that f(ψ) be a minimal subset implying ψ. Additionally, for Ψ ⊆ Γ to reflect
the conflict ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)), every formula in Ψ ⊆ Γ should be employed to
derive an element of ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)). The following definition captures both
notions:
Definition 5.16 (?-mapping). Given two knowledge bases ∆,Γ ∈ K, we say
f : ∆→ 2Γ is a ?-mapping if ⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ) = Γ and, for all ψ ∈ ∆, ψ ∈ Cn?(f(ψ))
and Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ).
In fact, ?-mappings could be used to define ?-weakening, thus ?-conflict, for
modular Cn?:
Proposition 5.17. Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K, a minimal inconsistent
set ∆ ∈ K and a modular, subclassical, Tarskian Cn?. ∆ is a ?-weakening of Γ
iff there is a ?-mapping f : ∆→ 2Γ.
Given the result above, we can safely extend the definition of ?-conflicts in
order to consider also non-modular consequence operations:
Definition 5.18 (?-conflict). Consider a base Γ ∈ K and a subclassical,
Tarskian Cn?. Γ is a ?-conflict if there are a minimal inconsistent set ∆ ∈
Cn?(Γ) and a ?-mapping f : ∆→ 2Γ.
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Example 5.19. Recall Example 5.14, where Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕ4} = {x1, x1 →
x2, x1 ∧ (x2 → x3),¬x3}, Cn? = Cn→ and Cn?(Γ) = Γ ∪ {x2}. The only
MISes of Cn?(Γ) are ∆ = {x2, ϕ3, ϕ4} and Ψ = Γ \ {x1}. Remember that
x2 is both in Cn
?({ϕ1, ϕ2}) and in Cn?({ϕ2, ϕ3}), but, for all ϕi ∈ Γ, x2 /∈
Cn?({ϕi}). Consider two ?-mappings, f : ∆→ 2Γ and f ′ : ∆→ 2Γ, defined as
f(ϕ3) = f
′(ϕ3) = {ϕ3}, f(ϕ4) = f ′(ϕ4) = {ϕ4}, f(x2) = {ϕ1, ϕ2} and f ′(x2) =
{ϕ2, ϕ3}. Note that, for any g ∈ {f, f ′}, for all ψ ∈ ∆, ψ ∈ Cn?(g(ψ)) and
Ψ ( g(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ). As ⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ) = Γ and
⋃
ψ∈∆
f ′(ψ) = Ψ, both Γ
and Ψ are ?-conflicts. That is, the “blame” for x2 in the MIS ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) can be
assigned to either {x1, x1 → x2} ⊆ Γ (via f) or {x1 → x2, x1 ∧ (x2 → x3)} ⊆ Γ
(via f ′), leading to two different ?-conflicts.
When Cn? is modular, Proposition 5.17 makes Definitions 5.2 and 5.18
equivalent, but the latter also allows for non-modular Cn? in the definition of
?-conflicts. Henceforth, unless differently stated, ?-conflict refers to Definition
5.18.
As desired, ?-conflicts are always inconsistent subsets of a given knowledge
base, and Proposition 5.5 can be generalised:
Proposition 5.20. Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K→ K. If a Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict, it is inconsistent.
This more general concept also generalises minimal inconsistent sets, so we
can prove Proposition 5.4 for the extended notion of ?-conflict.
Proposition 5.21. If a knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a minimal inconsistent set,
then it is ?-conflict.
Once more, the choice of the subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? yields two extreme instances for the ?-conflict concept:
• At one extreme, Cn? = CnId is the identity function (the weakest modular
case), and ?-conflicts are simply MISes;
• At the other extreme Cn? = Cn, the classical consequence operation.
Using Lemma 5.9, we can show that the second case is not interesting, leading
to the ?-conflict related to Cn? = Cnmod (see Theorem 5.10):
Theorem 5.22. Consider the consequence operation Cn? = Cn. Any finite
knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict iff it is inconsistent and it does not contain
valid formulas.
In the same way that minimal inconsistent sets are used to define free for-
mulas, we can employ ?-conflicts to introduce a new sort of “uncontroversial”
formula, defined as not taking part in these conflicts. For a modular consequence
operation Cn?, formulas out of any ?-conflict are exactly the ?-innocuous for-
mulas (see Theorem 5.11), dispensing with the introduction of a new concept.
Nonetheless, the next example shows this may be not the case with a non-
modular Cn?.
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Example 5.23. Recall Examples 5.14 and 5.19 and the corresponding Cn? =
Cn→. As Γ = {x1, x1 → x2, x1 ∧ (x2 → x3),¬x3} is a ?-conflict. Nevertheless,
x1 is not involved in any MIS of Cn(Γ) = Γ∪{x2}, which are Ψ = {x1 → x2, x1∧
(x2 → x3),¬x3} and ∆ = {x2, x1 ∧ (x2 → x3),¬x3}; thus x1 is ?-innocuous,
despite being in a ?-conflict. How “controversial” is x1? On the one hand, it
is consistent with any ?-consolidation of Γ, for it is ?-innocuous, and may be
ignored if one is to ?-consolidate Γ. On the other hand, x1 can be used together
with x1 → x2 to derive x2 in the MIS {x2, x1 ∧ (x2 → x3),¬x3} ⊆ Cn?(Γ).
The situation in the example above motivates the introduction of a new
concept to capture this type of “uncontroversial” formulas.
Definition 5.24 (?-free). A formula ϕ in a base Γ ∈ K is said to be ?-free in
Γ if, for all ?-conflict ∆ in Γ, ϕ /∈ ∆.
Corollary 5.25. If a formula ϕ is ?-free in a base Γ ∈ K, then ϕ is free in Γ.
Corollary 5.26. Consider a modular consequence operation Cn?. A formula
ϕ is ?-free in a base Γ ∈ K iff ϕ is ?-innocuous in Γ.
When we consider a general consequence operations Cn?, ?-free formula is
a stronger concept than ?-innocuous.
Proposition 5.27. If a formula ϕ is ?-free in Γ ∈ K, then ϕ is ?-innocuous in
Γ.
In the end, for a general Cn?, we put forward two distinct ways of telling
the controversial from the uncontroversial formulas in a knowledge base.
• ?-innocuous formulas: those that can be ignored while performing a ?-
consolidation, since they might be consistently added after ?-consolidating
the rest of the base;
• ?-free formulas: those not involved in the derivation of (i.e., that do not
belong to a minimal set of premises for deriving) a formula in a minimal
inconsistent subset of the Cn?-closure.
As we have shown, both concepts are equivalent for a modular consequence op-
eration Cn?, which seems to be the most useful case. For non-modular Cn?,
deciding which definition of controversial/uncontroversial formulas to use de-
pends on the application one is addressing.
The key results on localising inconsistency related to the choice of the conse-
quence operation Cn? ∈ {CnId, Cnmod, Cn} are summarised in Table 1, where
the entailed ?-conflict and ?-innocuous/free formula concepts are described. For
the other consequence operations presented, we could not provide a brief char-
acterisation for the yielded ?-conflicts and ?-innocuous/free formulas concepts,
which follow from their definitions. Figure 5 organises all particular instances
of Cn? discussed here by their strength.
23
Table 1: Extreme cases of Cn? and the characterisation of the related ?-conflict. The given
characterisation of ?-innocuous/free concepts holds for inconsistent bases, as in consistent
ones every formula is ?-innocuous/free.
Cn? ?-conflict ?-innocuous ?-free
CnId minimal inconsistent set free formula free formula
Cnmod inconsistent base with no tautology tautology tautology
Cn inconsistent base with no tautology tautology tautology
modular
(?-innocuous = ?-free)
non-modular
CnId
CnDalal
CnPI
Cn∧2
Cn∧
Cn→
CnPm2
CnPm
Cnmod
Cn
Figure 5: Instances of consequence operations Cn? with arcs oriented towards the stronger.
CnPI , CnPm and CnPm2 are defined in Section 6; and Cn
Dalal, in Section 7.2.
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6. Related Approaches
Before presenting how the machinery introduced in the previous sections
can be deployed in measuring inconsistency, we explore some works from the
literature that explicitly or implicitly characterise conflicts in a knowledge base
and show how they can be related to our framework.
6.1. Prime Implicates
Jabbour et al. investigate the problem of measuring inconsistency in knowl-
edge bases via counting conflicts [27]. The sort of atomic inconsistency they
propose to count has clear similarities to the ?-conflicts we put forward. Two
key differences are that they fix a modular consequence operation, allowing
formulas to be weakened only via discarding prime implicates, and conceive a
conflict as a pair, in which only one element is a subset of the base. To sum-
marise their approach, we need some definitions:
Definition 6.1 (prime implicate). A clause ψ is a prime implicate of a for-
mula ϕ ∈ L if
• ϕ ` ψ and
• for every clause ψ′, if ϕ ` ψ′ and ψ′ ` ψ, then ψ and ψ′ are equivalent.
Intuitively, prime implicates can be seen as the strongest clauses implied by
a formula. For a given ϕ ∈ L, we denote by PI(ϕ) the set of all prime implicates
of ϕ.
Example 6.2. Consider the formula ϕ = x1 ∧ (x1 ∨x2)∧ (¬x1 ∨x3)∧ (x3 ∨x4)
in L. Note that each conjunct in ϕ is a clause implied by it: x1, x1 ∨ x2,¬x1 ∨
x3, x3∨x4 ∈ Cn({ϕ}). As x1 implies x1∨x2, the latter is not a prime implicate
of ϕ. Applying resolution to x1 and ¬x1 ∨ x3, we can see that ϕ ` x3. As x3
implies both ¬x1 ∨ x3 and x3 ∨ x4, these two clauses are not prime implicates
either. As there are no stronger clauses implied by ϕ, PI(ϕ) = {x1, x3}.
Jabbour et al. [27] then employ prime implicates to define a type of conflict,
generalising MISes5:
Definition 6.3 (DMIS). Let Γ ∈ K be a knowledge base and M = 〈∆,Ψ〉
be such that ∆ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} ⊆ Γ and Ψ = {ψ1, . . . , ψm} ⊆ K. M is a MIS
modulo logical deduction DMIS if:
• ϕi ` ψi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
• PI(ψi) ⊆ PI(ϕi) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m;
• Ψ is a MIS;
5Jabbour et al. actually use the term “MUS” (minimal unsatisfiable subset), but we
continue with our notation, knowing both concepts are equivalent.
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• For all ψ ∈ Ψ, there is no ψ′ ∈ L such that
– ψ ` ψ′, PI(ψ′) ⊆ PI(ψ)6, but ψ′ 6` ψ and
– (Ψ \ {ψ}) ∪ {ψ′} is a MIS.
As the authors point out, the idea is to capture conflicts between subformu-
las, where the latter are understood via prime implicates. The last condition
imposes a kind of minimality for the MIS Ψ, where further weakening a ψ ∈ Ψ
would make Ψ consistent.
Example 6.4. To illustrate how DMISes work, consider again Example 3.3,
where Γ = {¬s∧¬g, (s∨m)∧ g,¬m}. Recall that ∆ = {¬s∧¬g, (s∨m)∧ g} is
the only MIS in Γ. One can see that 〈∆, {¬g, g}〉 satisfies the definition of DMIS.
Besides, note that ¬s, s ∨m and ¬m are consequences and prime implicates of
¬s∧¬g, (s∨m)∧g and ¬m, respectively. Furthermore, Ψ = {¬s, s∨m,¬m} is
a MIS satisfying the last condition in the definition above. Hence 〈Γ,Ψ〉 is also
a DMIS.
A working assumption in the present work is that conflicts must be localised
in the knowledge base; i.e., that every conflict of a knowledge base should be
its subset. DMIS is defined as a pair, where the first element is a subset of
the knowledge base, while the second is a minimal inconsistent set that can be
derived from it. Therefore, to present a correspondence between the framework
we introduced and DMISes, we consider only their first element:
Definition 6.5 (DMIS-conflict). A knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a DMIS-conflict
if there is a DMIS 〈Γ,∆〉.
Now we can investigate the relation between DMIS-conflicts and ?-conflicts.
Since DMIS-conflicts employ prime implicates to find the parts of formulas form-
ing a conflict, we employ a corresponding consequence operation Cn?. Let
CnPI : K → K be a modular consequence operator such that, for all ϕ,ψ ∈ L,
ψ ∈ CnPI({ϕ}) iff ϕ ` ψ and PI(ψ) ⊆ PI(ϕ).
Proposition 6.6. Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPI and a
knowledge base Γ ∈ K. If Γ is a DMIS-conflict, then Γ is a ?-conflict.
The equivalence between DMIS-conflicts and ?-conflicts, for Cn? = CnPI ,
does not hold, due to the fact that DMIS-conflicts are defined via weakening
each formula once, while ?-weakenings allow multiple consequences of the same
formula.
Example 6.7. Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPI , the formulas
ϕ = (x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) ∧ (x1 ∨ x3), ψ = ¬x1 ∧ ¬x3 and θ = ¬x4 in L
6The authors originally do not require such a relation between the sets of prime implicates
[27]. Nevertheless, it seems to be intended, for without it only singletons could be DMISes.
This is due to the fact that the MIS Ψ in the definition could be weakened to (Ψ \ {ψ1}) ∪
{ψ1 ∨ ¬ψ2} and would still be a MIS.
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and the knowledge base Γ = {ϕ,ψ, θ} in K. Computing the prime implicates of
each formula in Γ, we have:
• PI(ϕ) = {x1 ∨ x2,¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4, x1 ∨ x3};
• PI(ψ) = {¬x1,¬x3};
• PI(θ) = {¬x4}.
Note that x1 ∨ x2,¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4 ∈ Cn?({ϕ}), ¬x1 ∧ ¬x3 ∈ Cn?({ψ}) and
¬x4 ∈ Cn?({θ}). Therefore, the knowledge base ∆ = {x1 ∨ x2,¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨
x4,¬x1 ∧ ¬x3,¬x4} is a ?-weakening of Γ. Using resolution on x2, one can see
that ∆ is inconsistent, but note that each proper subset of it is consistent; thus
∆ is a MIS, and Γ is a ?-conflict. However, as |∆| > |Γ|, the pair 〈Γ,∆〉 is not a
DMIS. One can use conjunction to achieve |∆| = |Γ|, grouping the consequences
of ϕ: ∆′ = {(x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4),¬x1 ∧ ¬x3,¬x4}. Applying resolution
again, one can note that (x1 ∨ x3 ∨ x4) ∈ PI((x1 ∨ x2) ∧ (¬x2 ∨ x3 ∨ x4), but
(x1∨x3∨x4) 6∈ PI(ϕ), for (x1∨x3) ∈ PI(ϕ) implies (x1∨x3∨x4) Hence, even
though ∆′ is a MIS, 〈Γ,∆′〉 is not a DMIS. In fact, there is no DMIS 〈Γ,Ψ〉,
so Γ is not a DMIS-conflict.
What happens in the example above is that more than one CnPI -consequence
of ϕ is needed to form a MIS together with ψ, θ, and, due the nature of prime
implicates, their conjunction is not necessarily in CnPI({ϕ}). While ?-conflicts
can capture this, DMIS-conflicts fall short, for imposing that each formula in
a conflict contributes exactly one formula in the derived MIS. Depending on
the application and on the context, one or the other conflict characterisation
can be preferred. For instance, if a knowledge base Γ is to be consolidated
via weakening each formula exactly once, then DMIS-conflicts are more suitable
than ?-conflicts. Indeed, we could define a different type of ?-weakening, forcing
each formula to be weakened exactly once (using a bijective f in Definition 5.1),
to derive a notion of ?-conflict notion that is equivalent to the DMIS-conflict
concept.
6.2. Minimal Proofs for Opposite Literals
Another conflict characterisation is implicitly proposed by Jabbour and
Raddaoui [28]. They introduced an inconsistency measure (presented in Sec-
tion 7.2) based on minimal proofs for opposite literals, xi ∈ X and ¬xi. In
this section we focus on the notion of conflict underlying their inconsistency
measure, relating it to the ?-conflicts we propose.
While characterising atomic inconsistencies in a knowledge base, instead of
looking for minimal subsets implying ⊥, one could search for two minimal sets
entailing xi and ¬xi, respectively, for some xi ∈ X. Formally, given a Γ ∈ K,
pi ⊆ Γ is a minimal proof for a literal y if [28]:
• y ∈ Lit(pi);
• y ∈ Cn(pi);
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• pi′ ( pi implies y 6∈ Cn(pi′).
For a given knowledge base Γ ∈ K, let PΓm(y) ⊆ 2Γ denote the set of the
minimal proofs (in Γ) of the literal y.
Example 6.8. Consider the base Γ = {¬s∧¬g, (s∨m)∧ g,¬m} from Example
3.3. For each atomic proposition involved, we list the minimal proofs for the
corresponding literals:
• PΓm(s) = {{(s ∨m) ∧ g,¬m}}, PΓm(¬s) = {{¬s ∧ ¬g}};
• PΓm(g) = {{(s ∨m) ∧ g}}, PΓm(¬g) = {{¬s ∧ ¬g}};
• PΓm(m) = {{¬s ∧ ¬g, (s ∨m) ∧ g}}, PΓm(¬m) = {{¬m}}.
Jabbour and Raddaoui [28] proceed to define an inconsistency measure that
counts in how many different ways xi and ¬xi can be proved from a base, for
every xi appearing in the base. Putting it differently, they suggest the degree
of inconsistency of a knowledge base is the number of pairs 〈∆,∆′〉 such that ∆
is a minimal proof for xi and ∆
′ is a minimal proof for ¬xi. Even though the
authors do not explicitly define it, each such pair can be regarded as a sort of
conflict in the base. As we want a conflict to be simply a subset of the base, we
can take the union of such minimal proofs:
Definition 6.9 (opposite-literals conflict). A knowledge base Γ ∈ K is an
opposite-literals conflict if there are ∆,∆′ ⊆ Γ and a xi ∈ X such that ∆ and
∆′ are minimal proofs of xi and ¬xi, respectively, and Γ = ∆ ∪∆′.
Minimal inconsistent sets are naturally opposite-literals conflicts, but the
converse does not hold, as the following example shows:
Example 6.10. Back to Examples 3.3 and 6.8, where Γ = {¬s ∧ ¬g, (s ∨m) ∧
g,¬m}, recall that Ψ = {¬s∧¬g, (s∨m)∧g} is the only MIS in Γ. Nevertheless,
taking the minimal proofs of s and ¬s, we have ∆ = {(s ∨ m) ∧ g,¬m} and
∆′ = ¬s ∧ ¬g, respectively. Since Γ = ∆ ∪∆′, Γ is an opposite-literals conflict.
Considering the literals m,¬m, we would arrive at the same conclusion.
Contrarily to minimal inconsistent sets, opposite-literal conflicts take into
account the path to prove the contradiction. In the example above, premises
for the contradiction to be proved via g and ¬g are strictly contained on the
premises used to prove ⊥ through s and ¬s, making MISes unable to capture
the larger conflict.
To relate conflicts based on contradicting atomic propositions to our frame-
work, we need a consequence operation that derives these pairs of opposite
literals. Let CnPm : K→ K be a consequence operation defined as CnPm(Γ) =
{y ∈ Cn(Γ)|y is a literal} for any Γ ∈ K. As CnPm(Γ) contains only literals,
every minimal inconsistent subset CnPm(Γ) has the form {xi,¬xi}, for some
atomic proposition xi ∈ X. For a given Ψ = {xi,¬xi} in MIS(CnPm(Γ)), we
can employ a function f : Ψ → Γ to trace back the minimal set of premises in
Γ used to derive each literal in Ψ. Each opposite-literals conflict corresponds
then to a ?-conflict yielded by the range of such a function.
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Proposition 6.11. Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPm . If a
knowledge base Γ ∈ K is an opposite-literals conflict, then it is a ?-conflict.
Note that the converse is not true. Consider for instance the base Γ =
{x1∧¬x1, x2∧¬x2}. As x1 ∈ CnPm({x1∧¬x1}) and ¬x1 ∈ CnPm({x2∧¬x2}),
Γ is a ?-conflict. Nevertheless, as x1 does not appear in x2 ∧ ¬x2, the latter is
not a minimal proof of a literal involving the former. Analogously, x1 ∧ ¬x1 is
not a minimal proof of x2 or ¬x2. Therefore, Γ is not a opposite-literals conflict.
In order to find a ?-conflict definition that is equivalent to the opposite-
literals conflict concept, we can try to adapt CnPm , forcing an entailed literal
to appear in the premises, as minimal proofs do. Let CnPm2 : K → K be a
consequence operation defined as CnPm2 (Γ) = {y ∈ Cn(Γ)|y ∈ Lit(Γ)}. The
next example points out the difference between CnPm and CnPm2 .
Example 6.12. Consider the knowledge base Γ = {x1 ∧ ¬x1, x2 ∨ x3}. As Γ
is inconsistent, Cn(Γ) = L. Therefore, CnPm(Γ) = {y ∈ L|y is a literal}, and
x1, x2, · · · ∈ CnPm(Γ). In contrast, to be in CnPm2 (Γ), a literal must additionally
appear in Γ. Hence, x1, x2, x3 ∈ CnPm2 (Γ), but x4, x5, . . . /∈ CnPm2 (Γ). Taking
Ψ = {x1 ∧ ¬x1}, we have again that CnPm(Ψ) = {y ∈ L|y is a literal}, but
CnPm2 (Ψ) = {x1,¬x1}.
Using Cn? = CnPm2 , we can also prove that opposite-literal conflicts are
?-conflicts:
Proposition 6.13. Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPm2 . If a
knowledge base Γ ∈ K is an opposite-literals conflict, then it is a ?-conflict.
Again, the converse does not hold. Consider Γ = {x1 ∧ ¬x1, x2 ∨ x3,¬x2}.
Note that x2 is in Cn
Pm
2 ({x1∧¬x1, x2∨x3}) but not in CnPm2 ({x1∧¬x1}). Thus,
the MIS {x2,¬x2} ⊆ CnPm2 (Γ) corresponds to the ?-conflict Γ. Nonetheless,
there is no minimal proof of x2 in Γ, and {x1 ∧¬x1} is its only opposite-literals
conflict.
The reason for no ?-conflict concept having been shown equivalent to the
opposite-literals conflict notion is the fact that minimal proofs of y must im-
ply y and contain y, but the minimality is required only for the implication.
Nevertheless, since each ?-conflict presented, Cn? = CnPm and Cn? = CnPm2 ,
encompass all opposite-literals conflicts, their usefulness shall be clear in Section
7.2.
7. Applications to Inconsistency Measuring
Localising the controversial portion of an inconsistent knowledge base, as well
as each primitive conflict, may be an end in itself or useful for some consolidation
procedures, as Examples 4.9 and 5.7 indicate. Furthermore, via straightforward
applications to measuring inconsistency, the role of conflict characterisation in
inconsistency handling becomes evident. New primitive conflict characterisa-
tions automatically give new inconsistency measures. Additionally, controver-
sial postulates for inconsistency measures can also be reworked on the basis of
the framework introduced here.
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7.1. New Inconsistency Measures
The problem of measuring inconsistency in knowledge bases over logical lan-
guages has increasingly received attention during recent years (for a survey, see
[42, 43]). An inconsistency measure is a function I : K→ [0,∞)∪{∞}7, which
takes knowledge bases and returns non-negative real numbers or ∞. Addition-
ally, one expects that such a function hold basic properties, which were proposed
by Hunter and Konieczny [24, 25] in their basic inconsistency measure definition
and became rationality postulates:
Definition 7.1. Let I : K→ [0,∞) ∪ {∞} be an inconsistency measure:
• (Consistency) For any Γ ∈ K, I(Γ) = 0 iff Γ is consistent.
• (Monotonicity) For any Γ ∪ {α} ∈ K, I(Γ ∪ {α}) ≥ I(Γ).
• (Independence) For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ ∈ Γ, if ϕ is free in Γ, then
I(Γ \ {ϕ}) = I(Γ).
• (Dominance) For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ,ψ ∈ L, if ϕ ` ψ and ϕ 6` ⊥, then
I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}).
A direct approach to try to satisfy these postulates is measuring the in-
consistency of a knowledge base through its minimal inconsistent subsets. The
underlying rationale is that the more MISes a base contains, the more inconsis-
tent it is. The simplest MIS-based measure just counts the MISes in the base
[24]:
IMIS(Γ) = |MIS(Γ)| .
Despite the fact that IMIS considers the number of minimal inconsistent
sets, it does not assess their severity. A way to accomplish that is grounded in
the idea that the larger the MIS, the less inconsistent it is. Based on this, the
following inconsistency measure is defined in a way that each MIS’s contribution
to the whole inconsistency is inversely proportional to its size [24]:
IMISC (Γ) =
∑
∆∈MIS(Γ)
1
|∆| .
Even though IMIS and IMISC satisfy (Consistency), (Monotony) and (In-
dependence) but not (Dominance), they clearly fail to capture conflicts different
from minimal inconsistent sets.
Example 7.2. Consider again Γ = {¬s ∧ ¬g, (s ∨ m) ∧ g,¬m} from Ex-
ample 3.3. The single MIS in Γ is ∆ = {¬s ∧ ¬g, (s ∨ m) ∧ g, }. Hence,
IMIS(Γ) = IMIS(∆) = 1 and IMISC (Γ) = IMISC (∆) = 1/2. In fact, since ¬m
is free in Γ, (Independence) requires that its withdrawal from the base does not
7We allow inconsistency measurements to be infinite in order to deal with infinite knowledge
bases.
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alter the inconsistency measurement. Therefore, any inconsistency measure I
satisfying (Independence) is such that I(Γ) = I(∆). Nevertheless, as we argued
in Example 3.3, ¬m is somehow contributing to the inconsistency.
As minimal inconsistent sets have been generalised to ?-conflicts, parame-
terised by a consequence operation Cn?, new inconsistency measures naturally
arise.
I?(Γ) = |{∆ ⊆ Γ|∆ is a ? -conflict}| .
I?C (Γ) =
∑
∆⊆Γ is a ?-conflict
1
|∆| .
Given a consequence operation Cn?, I? and I?C are measures designed to
capture the derived ?-conflicts. Consequently, these inconsistency measures are
capable of discriminating the knowledge bases Γ and ∆ presented in Example
7.2, which is not achieved by any measure satisfying (Independence), such as
the recently proposed ICC , IW and Icf [26] for instance. This is due the fact
that ∆ = Γ \ {¬m}, with ¬m being free in Γ, hence I(Γ) = I(∆) for any I
satisfying (Independence).
Example 7.3. Recall from Example 5.6 that Γ = {¬s ∧ ¬g, (s ∨m) ∧ g,¬m}
is a ?-conflict if ¬s ∈ Cn?(¬s ∧ ¬g). By Proposition 5.21, the MIS ∆ =
{¬s ∧ ¬g, (s ∨ m) ∧ g, } is also a ?-conflict. As the other subsets of Γ are
consistent, and Cn? is subclassical, Γ and ∆ are the only ?-conflicts in Γ. Hence,
I?(Γ) = 2 > 1 = I?(∆) and I?C (Γ) = 1/2 + 1/3 = 5/6 > 1/2 = I?C (∆).
Proposition 7.4. Consider a subclassical Tarskian consequence operation Cn? :
K→ K. I? and I?C satisfy (Consistency) and (Monotonicity).
The postulates of (Independence) and (Dominance) can be either satisfied or
violated by I? and I?C , depending on the choice of the consequence operation
Cn?. In Sections 7.2 and 7.3, these postulates are parametrised by Cn?, yielding
properties that will be shown to hold for I? and I?C for any Tarskian Cn?.
To better characterise I? and I?C , we consider some additional properties
for inconsistency measures from the literature [41]:
Definition 7.5. Let I : K→ [0,∞) ∪ {∞} be an inconsistency measure:
• (Super-additivity) For any Γ,∆ ∈ K, if Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅, then I(Γ ∪ ∆) ≥
I(Γ) + I(∆).
• (Penalty) For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ ∈ Γ, if ϕ is not free in Γ, then I(Γ\{ϕ}) <
I(Γ).
• (Attenuation) For any Γ ∈ K, if ∆1,∆2 ∈ MIS(Γ) and I(∆1) < I(∆2),
then |∆1| > |∆2|.
• (Equal-conflict) For any Γ ∈ K, if ∆1,∆2 ∈ MIS(Γ) and I(∆1) = I(∆2),
then |∆1| = |∆2|.
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Proposition 7.6. Consider a subclassical Tarskian consequence operation Cn? :
K → K. I? and I?C satisfy (Super-additivity), (Penalty) and (Attenuation).
(Equal-conflict) is satisfied by I?C and violated by I?.
Another way of assessing the behaviour of an inconsistency measure is through
its expressivity power. Thimm [42] proposes a method to quantify this expres-
sivity in four dimensions, defined via bounding either the size of, or the number
of atoms in, either the whole knowledge base or each formula. Although we
do not formally present Thimm’s whole framework, it can be proved that, for
any Tarskian Cn?, I? and I?C , similarly to IMIS and IMISC , have the highest
possible expressivity for three of out the four dimensions. This is due to the fact
that every minimal inconsistent set is a ?-conflict. The remaining dimension is
when the size of knowledge bases is fixed, when both I? and I?C have finite
range.
Inconsistency measures can be employed to guide the repair of inconsistent
knowledge bases. For instance, Grant and Hunter [18] presented a stepwise
inconsistency resolution procedure where at each step a formula is weakened,
split or deleted, aiming at reducing the inconsistency degree of the knowledge
base. Although a detailed discussion of such methods is out of the scope of
this work, a modular consequence operation Cn? can formalise a particular way
of weakening formulas, yielding measures I? and I?C that could drive a repair
method for knowledge bases.
7.2. New Independence Properties
Apart from enabling us to put forward new inconsistency measures, the con-
cepts introduced in the present work allow us to generalise some postulates for
inconsistency measures. From Example 7.3, where discarding the free formula
¬m decreases the inconsistency measurement, one can note that the correspond-
ing I? and I?C fail to satisfy (Independence). This is not surprising, since this
postulate is strongly linked to minimal inconsistent sets being conceived as the
primitive conflicts or atomic inconsistencies in a knowledge base. The (Inde-
pendence) postulate has been criticised for this [8, 11], and a relaxed version
was proposed in the probabilistic logic context [11]. Actually, the proponents
of (Independence) have acknowledged that it may be too strong a property to
require in some cases [25], suggesting a weaker version:
Postulate 7.7 (Weak Independence). For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ ∈ Γ, if ϕ is
safe in Γ, then I(Γ \ {ϕ}) = I(Γ).
Considering the possibility of I? and I?C satisfying (Weak Independence)
for any subclassical, Tarskian Cn?, Theorem 4.13 points to a negative answer as
well. For instance, consider a modular consequence operation such that `?= `.
In the base Γ = {x1 ∧ ¬x1, x2}, x2 is safe, and (Weak Independence) implies
I(Γ) = I(Γ\{x2}). Nevertheless, by Theorem 4.13, x2 is not ?-innocuous, for it
is not valid – note that {x1 ∧¬x1 ∨¬x2, x2} is a MIS and ?-weakening of Γ. By
Theorem 5.11, x2 must be in a ?-conflict of Γ, thus discarding x2 should impact
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the inconsistency degree given by I? and I?C . Indeed, Γ and Γ \ {x2} are the
only ?-conflicts in Γ, so I?(Γ) > I?(Γ \ {x2}) and I?C (Γ) > I?C (Γ \ {x2}).
Since the problem with (Independence) is its strong dependency on minimal
inconsistent sets, and these are generalised by ?-conflicts, a natural idea is to
parameterise the postulate by the conflict characterisation.
Property 7.8 (?-Independence). For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ ∈ Γ, if ϕ is ?-free in
Γ, then I(Γ \ {ϕ}) = I(Γ).
We call (?-Independence) a property, and not a postulate, due to the fact
that we do not intend to impose any instance of it as a rationality constraint
on inconsistency measures.
Recall that a formula is ?-free in a knowledge base Γ if it does not belong
to any ?-conflict in Γ. If Cn? is the identity function, then ?-conflicts are the
minimal inconsistent subsets of the base, and (?-Independence) is equivalent to
(Independence). In the other extreme, if Cn? is the classical consequence oper-
ation Cn, or even a modular consequence operation such that `?= `, then only
valid formulas are ?-free in inconsistent bases. In that case, (?-Independence)
becomes independence from tautologies, which is the weakest instance of the
property. Arguably, the raising of this instance of (?-Independence) to a postu-
late would be the least disputable.
Naturally, measures entirely based on ?-conflicts enjoy (?-Independence):
Proposition 7.9. Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation Cn? :
K→ K. I? and I?C satisfy (?-Independence).
Given a consequence operation Cn?, we have both a pair of inconsistency
measures I? and I?C and a (?-Independence) property that holds for them.
That is, each possible (?-Independence) property is satisfied by some inconsis-
tency measure. This can be regarded as a rather trivial achievement, for both
the measures and the property are based on ?-conflicts. Nevertheless, we put
forward (?-Independence) properties to be employed as a tool to classify in-
consistency measures that do not satisfy the original (Independence), capturing
the sort of atomic inconsistencies they are independent from. To illustrate that
usefulness, we analyse two measures from the literature.
Grant and Hunter [19, 20] introduce a family of inconsistency measures based
on distance from consistency. They consider the set of valuations satisfying each
formula in a knowledge base and then measure how much these sets should be
modified for their intersection to be non-empty. Formally, if V is the set of
valuations v : L → {0, 1}, the Dalal distance [9] is a function d : V × V →
[0,∞) ∪ {∞} defined as:
d(v, v′) =
∣∣{xi ∈ X|v(xi) 6= v′(xi)}∣∣
In other words, d(v, v′) counts the number of atomic propositions on which
the valuations v and v′ disagree. Using this distance between valuations, a
distance D : V × 2V → [0,∞) ∪ {∞} can be defined, for any v ∈ V and any
non-empty set W ⊆ V , as:
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D(v,W ) = min{d(v, v′)|v′ ∈W}
Given an inconsistent knowledge base Γ that is formed by consistent formu-
las, one can compute the distance between a given valuation v ∈ V and the set
of valuations satisfying each ϕ ∈ Γ. By looking for the valuation v ∈ V min-
imising the sum or the maximum of such distances, two inconsistency measures
arise. Let Kc denote the set of knowledge bases in K containing only consistent
formulas. For any ϕ ∈ L, define [[ϕ]] = {v ∈ V, v(ϕ) = 1}. For any Γ ∈ K,
the inconsistency measures IsumDalal : Kc → [0,∞) and ImaxDalal : Kc → [0,∞) are
defined as:
IsumDalal(Γ) = min
∑
ϕ∈Γ
D(v, [[ϕ]])
∣∣v ∈ V

ImaxDalal(Γ) = min
{
max
ϕ∈Γ
D(v, [[ϕ]])
∣∣v ∈ V}
Example 7.10. Let Γ = {x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4,¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x5 ∧ x6, (¬x3 ∨¬x5)∧
(¬x4 ∨ ¬x6)} be a knowledge base in K. Consider the valuation v : L → {0, 1}
such that v(x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∧ x5 ∧ x6) = 1. Computing the Dalal distances,
we have:
D(v, [[x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4]]) = D(v, [[¬x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ x5 ∧ x6]] = 1 and
D(v, [[(¬x3 ∨ ¬x5) ∧ (¬x4 ∨ ¬x6)]] = 2 .
Consequently,
∑
ϕ∈Γ
D(v, [[ϕ]]) = 4 and max
ϕ∈Γ
D(v, [[ϕ]]) = 2. The reader can check
that there is no other valuation yielding a lesser sum (or maximum) for the
Dalal distances. Intuitively, the conflicts {x1,¬x1}, {x2,¬x2}, {x3, x5,¬x3 ∨
¬x5} and {x4, x6,¬x4 ∨ ¬x6} are each responsible for a unitary summand in∑
ϕ∈Γ
D(v, [[ϕ]]) = 4. Therefore, any valuation v′ : L → {0, 1} is such that∑
ϕ∈Γ
D(v′, [[ϕ]]) ≥ 4. Hence, at least a ϕ ∈ Γ must be such that D(v′, [[ϕ]]) ≥ 2,
for any v′. So we have IsumDalal(Γ) = 4 and ImaxDalal(Γ) = 2.
Now note that ∆ = {x1∧x2∧x3∧x4,¬x1∧¬x2∧x5∧x6} is the only minimal
inconsistent subset of Γ. Using the same valuation, we have
∑
ϕ∈∆
D(v, [[ϕ]]) = 2
and max
ϕ∈∆
D(v, [[ϕ]]) = 1. Again, the reader can check that these are the minimum
attainable values, thus IsumDalal(∆) = 2 and ImaxDalal(∆) = 1.
In the example above, one can tell that (Independence) is violated by both
IsumDalal and ImaxDalal: θ = (¬x3 ∨ ¬x5) ∧ (¬x4 ∨ ¬x6) is free in Γ, but IsumDalal(Γ) >
IsumDalal(Γ \ {θ}) and ImaxDalal(Γ) > ImaxDalal(Γ \ {θ}).
A ?-conflict whose corresponding (?-Independence) is satisfied by IsumDalal and
ImaxDalal can be constructed via analysing the underlying consolidation procedure
of the measures. These measures dilate the set of valuations satisfying each
formula until the knowledge base is satisfiable. Such dilation in the models
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is dual to a weakening in the formulas, which can be encoded into a modular
consequence operation.
Formally, for any ϕ ∈ L and n ∈ N ∪ {∞}, let ϕn ∈ L denote an arbitrary
formula such that [[ϕn]] = {v ∈ V |D(v, [[ϕ]]) ≤ n}. Let CnDalal : K → K be
a modular consequence operation such that ψ ∈ CnDalal(ϕ) iff ψ is equivalent
to ϕn for some n ∈ N ∪ {∞} 8. Since CnDalal is modular, the corresponding
?-conflicts can be defined via ?-weakenings, using Definition 5.2, and the derived
definition of ?-free yields a suitable version of (?-Independence):
Proposition 7.11. Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnDalal. IsumDalal
and ImaxDalal satisfy (?-Independence).
For instance, recall the situation in Example 7.10, where Γ = {ϕ,ψ, (¬x3 ∨
¬x5)∧ (¬x4 ∨¬x6)}, where ϕ = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 and ψ = ¬x1 ∧¬x2 ∧ x5 ∧ x6.
Using Cn? = CnDalal, we can weaken ϕ and ψ to form:
ϕ1 = x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x3 ∨ x1 ∧ x2 ∧ x4 ∨ x1 ∧ x3 ∧ x4 ∨ x2 ∧ x3 ∧ x4
ψ1 = ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ x5 ∨ ¬x1 ∧ ¬x2 ∧ x6 ∨ ¬x1 ∧ x5 ∧ x6 ∨ ¬x2 ∧ x5 ∧ x6
Note that ϕ1 ∈ CnDalal({ϕ}) and ψ1 ∈ CnDalal({ψ}), thus ϕ1, ψ1 ∈ CnDalal(Γ),
for CnDalal is modular. The base ∆ = {ϕ1, ψ1, (¬x3 ∨ ¬x5) ∧ (¬x4 ∨ ¬x6)} ⊆
CnDalal(Γ) is a ?-weakening of Γ. As ∆ is a MIS, Γ is a ?-conflict. Therefore,
θ = (¬x3 ∨ ¬x5) ∧ (¬x4 ∨ ¬x6) is not ?-free in Γ. Consequently, the fact that
IsumDalal(Γ) > IsumDalal(Γ \ {θ}) and ImaxDalal(Γ) > ImaxDalal(Γ \ {θ}) does not imply
violating (?-Independence).
Another example of inconsistency measure in which ?-conflicts can be suit-
ably applied to find the “uncontroversial” formulas is due to Jabbour and
Raddaoui [28]. They introduced an inconsistency measure based on minimal
proofs for opposite literals — which are presented in Section 6.2. Their mea-
sure intuitively counts in how many different ways a contradiction of the form
{xi,¬xi} can be proved from an inconsistent Γ, in terms of the premises for
deriving each conflicting literal.
Formally, recall from Section 6.2 that PΓm(y) ⊆ 2Γ denotes the set of the
minimal proofs (in Γ) of the literal y. The authors then define the inconsistency
measure IPm : K→ [0,∞) ∪∞, for all Γ ∈ K, as [28] 9:
IPm(Γ) =
∑
xi∈X
|PΓm(xi)|.|PΓm(¬xi)|
Example 7.12. Jabbour and Raddaoui [28] provide the following example: Γ =
{x1 ∧ ¬x1, x1}. There are two minimal proofs of x1, {x1 ∧ ¬x1} and {x1}, and
only one minimal proof of ¬x1, {x1 ∧¬x1}. As no other literal appears in Γ, in
8The possibility of n = ∞ allows any formula to be weakened to a tautology
9The original definition is different, but we employ a characterisation given by the authors
[28].
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order to compute IPm(Γ) one can ignore other atomic propositions than x1:
IPm(Γ) = |PΓm(x1)|.|PΓm(¬x1)| = 2× 1 = 2 .
If one considers the singleton ∆ = {x1 ∧ ¬x1}, there is only one minimal proof
for each y ∈ {x1,¬x1}, and IPm(∆) = 1.
Jabbour and Raddaoui [28] note that IPm does not satisfy (Independence),
pointing to the counterexample above — note that x1 is free in Γ. Using the
consequence operations Cn? = CnPm or Cn? = CnPm2 , introduced in Section
6.2, we can again employ the ?-free formula concept to identify the formulas that
do not contribute to the base’s degree of inconsistency. As proved in Section
6.2, the corresponding ?-conflict definitions captures the subsets of a base that
are the union of minimal proofs of both xi and ¬xi, for some xi. Consequently,
the corresponding ?-free formulas yield (?-Independence) properties suitable for
IPm :
Proposition 7.13. If either Cn? = CnPm or Cn? = CnPm2 , then IPm satisfies
(?-Independence).
In this section, to derive new versions of the (Independence) postulate, we
have replaced “free formula” by “?-free formula” in its definition. Alternatively,
we could have used ?-innocuous formulas to define another form of (Indepen-
dence):
Property 7.14 (?-Independence′). For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ ∈ Γ, if ϕ is ?-
innocuous in Γ, then I(Γ \ {ϕ}) = I(Γ).
Corollary 7.15. If Cn? is a modular, subclassical, Tarskian consequence op-
eration, (?-Independence) and (?-Independence’) are equivalent.
In some contexts, this might be a more useful property. For instance, if one
considers ?-consolidating a knowledge base, an inconsistency measure satisfying
(?-Independence′) will ignore exactly those (?-innocuous) formulas that can be
bypassed while restoring consistency (see Proposition 4.10).
A postulate related to (Independence) is (Ind-Decomposability) [26], which
requires that inconsistency measures be additive over partitions of the knowl-
edge base that do not break any minimal inconsistent set. Replacing minimal
inconsistent sets by ?-conflicts in the definition of (Ind-decomposability) we
could similarly obtain a property parameterised by Cn?, which would hold for
instance for I? and I?C .
7.3. New Dominance Properties
An arguably more problematic postulate is (Dominance). This postulate
seems sensible to the extent that it requires that replacing a consistent formula in
a knowledge base by a logically weaker one should not increase its inconsistency
degree. Besnard [8] argues against (Dominance), analysing its behaviour on
disjunctions. Jabbour et al. [27] note that the measure IMIS , based on minimal
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inconsistent sets, does not satisfy (Dominance), and that it would be “rarely
(be) satisfied by syntactic measures”. They propose a weaker version of the
postulate, claimed as more rational, that is satisfied by an inconsistency measure
they also introduce. What neither author criticise is the following consequence
of (Dominance) along with (Monotonicity), which was noted by Besnard, but
not remarked on as a problem [8]:
Proposition 7.16. Let I : K→ [0,∞)∪{∞} be an inconsistency measure that
satisfies (Monotonicity) and (Dominance) and consider a Γ ∈ K. If a ψ ∈ L is
such that ψ ∈ Cn(ϕ) for some consistent ϕ ∈ Γ, then I(Γ) = I(Γ ∪ {ψ}).
To grasp the consequences of the proposition above, consider an inconsistent
base Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} formed by consistent formulas. Let ϕ′i /∈ Γ be a formula
equivalent to ϕi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and define and ∆ = {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ′m}. Any
measure I satisfying (Dominance) and (Monotonicity) must be such that I(Γ) =
I(Γ ∪∆). In other words, the fact that all conflicts of Γ (MISes or ?-conflicts)
are duplicated in Γ ∪ ∆ does not impact the inconsistency degree. Iterating
this argument, a base could have its conflicts arbitrarily replicated without
having its inconsistency measurement affected. Even though this consequence
might be conceivable under some circumstances, we cannot see the case for this
being a strict requirement, implied by rationality postulates. As (Monotonicity)
naturally has a great appeal to intuition, (Dominance) seems too strong to be
demanded. Fortunately, this issue can be easily fixed by strictly encoding the
intuition that replacing a consistent formula for a weaker one should not increase
the inconsistency degree10:
Postulate 7.17 (Dominance′). For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ,ψ ∈ L\Γ, if ϕ ` ψ and
ϕ 6` ⊥, then I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}.
Besnard’s [8] objections to (Dominance) also apply to (Dominance′), al-
though we do not endorse them. His argument considers a knowledge base Γ =
{x1∧x2∧· · ·∧xn} and the formulas ϕ = ¬x1 and ψ = ¬x1∨(¬x2∧¬x3∧· · ·∧¬xn)
in L, for some large n ≥ 3. He states that the inconsistency in Γ ∪ {ϕ} is
x1 versus ¬x1, while the inconsistency in Γ ∪ {ψ} is either the same (x1 ver-
sus ¬x1) or x2 ∧ x3 ∧ . . . xn versus ¬x2 ∧ ¬x3 ∧ . . .¬xn, and the latter in-
consistency could be viewed as more severe than the former. He concludes
that it is conceivable that I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) < I(Γ ∪ {ψ}), violating (Dominance)
and (Dominance′). To address this, Besnard proposes a system of postulates
that does not include (Dominance) but implies it. To replace (Dominance),
Besnard suggests a postulate he calls (Conjunction Dominance), which im-
plies, in his objection, I(Γ ∪ {ϕ ∧ ψ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}). This postulate, to-
gether with I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) < I(Γ ∪ {ψ}) (claimed as conceivable), would imply
I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) < I(Γ ∪ {ψ}) ≤ I(Γ ∪ {ϕ ∧ ψ}). Nevertheless, note that ϕ is
equivalent to ϕ ∧ ψ in his objection, and thus it does not seem reasonable that
I(Γ ∪ {ϕ ∧ ψ}) > I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}).
10Ammoura et al. [2] propose a similar postulate called Weak-Dominance.
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As for the objections from Jabbour et al. [27], (Dominance′) is satisfied
by some measures from the literature that arguably possess synctatic traits,
as Inc presented in [42] (adapted from [13]), Thimm’s Ihs [42], Knight’s η-
(in)consistency [29], 11 and Grant and Hunter’s Ihitd [19, 20]. However, (Dominance′)
still does not hold for the arguably basic measure IMIS , as the next example
shows.
Example 7.18. Consider the knowledge base Γ = {x1, x2, x2 ∧ x3} in K and
the formulas ϕ = ¬x1 and ψ = x2 → ¬x1 in L. The only MIS in Γ ∪ {ϕ} is
{x1,¬x1}, thus IMIS(Γ∪{ϕ}) = 1. The knowledge base Γ∪{ψ} has two MISes,
{x1, x2, x2 → ¬x1} and {x1, x2 ∧ x3, x2 → ¬x1}, hence IMIS(Γ ∪ {ψ}) = 2. As
ϕ,ψ /∈ Γ, ϕ is consistent and ϕ ` ψ, but IMIS(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) < IMIS(Γ ∪ {ψ}),
(Dominance′) does not hold for IMIS.
Jabbour et al. [27] put forward both a weaker version of (Dominance) and
a new measure via counting conflicts in order to achieve compatibility. Their
approach is based on prime implicates, as indicated in Section 6.1. Using the
consequence operation CnPI , introduced in Section 6.1, and departing from
(Dominance′)12, their postulate can be stated as:
Postulate 7.19 (Weak Dominance). For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ,ψ ∈ L \ Γ, if
ψ ∈ CnPI({ϕ}) and ϕ 6` ⊥, then I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}.
Jabbour et al. [27] prove that an inconsistency measure based on DMISes
(see section 6.1) satisfies this postulate. Since CnPI can be replaced, in the
postulate above, by a general modular consequence operation Cn?, we can define
a more general property:
Property 7.20 (?-Dominance). For any Γ ∈ K and ϕ,ψ ∈ L \ Γ, if ϕ `? ψ
and ϕ 6` ⊥, then I(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ≥ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}.
Adopting the consequence operation Cn? = CnPI , the (?-Dominance) prop-
erty becomes equivalent to the (Weak Dominance) postulate. Therefore, the in-
consistency measure proposed by Jabbour et al. [27] also satisfies this instance
of (?-Dominance).
The motivations of Jabbour et al. [27] apparently include the search for
one way of reconciling a version of (Dominance) with an inconsistency mea-
sure based on counting conflicts. Towards that aim, we can prove that the
general inconsistency measures I? and I?C , based on arbitrary ?-conflicts, sat-
isfy the corresponding version of the dominance property, for the corresponding
Cn?. Putting it differently, each modular, subclassical Tarskian consequence
operation Cn? gives us a way of reconciling (Dominance) with conflict-based
measures.
11Knight [29] actually defines a consistency value η ∈ [0, 1] for inconsistent bases, which
naturally yields an inconsistency degree 1-η.
12The original postulate from Jabbour et al. [27] actually allows for ϕ,ψ ∈ Γ, but it happens
to be violated by the inconsistency measure they devise to satisfy it.
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Proposition 7.21. Consider a modular, subclassical, Tarskian consequence op-
eration Cn? : K→ K. I? and I?C satisfy (?-Dominance).
As done for (Independence) in Section 7.2, (?-Dominance) properties form a
scale parameterised by the modular consequence operation Cn?. The stronger
the consequence operation, the more (?-Dominance) requires from an incon-
sistency measure. At one extreme, `?= ` and (?-Dominance) is equivalent to
(Dominance′). At the other extreme, ϕ `? ψ implies ϕ = ψ and (?-Dominance)
is vacuous. In the middle, there is a myriad of properties including those deriv-
ing from CnDalal and CnPI , for instance. Furthermore, for each (?-Dominance),
we have a pair of measures — I? and I?C — satisfying it, showing the whole
spectrum is populated. Within this entire range, we do not see sufficient rea-
son to lift a single (?-Dominance) property, and its logical consequences, to the
status of postulate, for the choice of the corresponding Cn? would be arbitrary
if not inside with respect to a given context.
The weakening of (Dominance) proposed by Jabbour et al. [27] was for-
mulated in a way that enabled it to be satisfied by an inconsistency measure
based solely on the number of conflicts in the bases. That raises the question
of why both the postulate and the conflict characterisation had to be modi-
fied. In principle, there could be a weaker version of (Dominance′) that holds
for IMIS . Alternatively, counting another sort of conflict could yield an in-
consistency measure satisfying (Dominance′) or even (Dominance), which could
support the corresponding postulate endorsement. We proceed to investigate
both possibilities.
Suppose one wants to weaken somehow the (Dominance′) postulate for it to
hold for IMIS , the measure that simply counts minimal inconsistent subsets in
a base. Considering the possible instances of (?-Dominance), we find that only
a trivial `? renders a property satisfied by IMIS :
Proposition 7.22. Let Cn? : K → K be a modular, subclassical, Tarskian
consequence operator. IMIS satisfies (?-Dominance) iff ϕ `? ψ implies ϕ and
ψ are equivalent for all consistent, non-valid ϕ,ψ ∈ L.
In other words, the version of dominance satisfied by IMIS is based on a very
weak modular consequence operation: for a consistent ϕ, Cn?({ϕ}) contains
only tautologies besides formulas equivalent to ϕ. It is hard to conceive a sensible
inconsistency measure violating such (?-Dominance). This can be assessed as
enough evidence supporting the promotion of this specific (?-Dominance) to a
postulate. Although it is a reasonable requirement indeed, the strength of the
related Cn? barely justifies the term “dominance”.
Instead of justifying some weakening of (Dominance) via IMIS , one might
wonder which conflict characterisation could lead to an inconsistency measure
satisfying (Dominance′) or the original (Dominance), arguing in its favour. Let
C denote a set of knowledge bases in K that can be regarded as atomic incon-
sistencies according to some definition. We define IC : K→ [0,∞)∪{∞} as the
inconsistency measure such that, for all Γ ∈ K:
IC(Γ) = |{∆ ⊆ Γ|∆ ∈ C}| .
39
For IC to satisfy (Consistency), we need to require that it contains only incon-
sistent bases and all MISes in K. For instance, if C is the set of all ?-conflicts,
IC = I?. Now, we can abandon the idea of finding a set C of conflicts whose
counting gives an inconsistency measure satisfying (Dominance) in its strongest
form.
Proposition 7.23. Let C be a set of inconsistent knowledge bases such that
MIS(L) ⊆ C. IC does not satisfy (Dominance).
Corollary 7.24. There is no subclassical Tarskian consequence operation Cn? :
K→ K such that I? satisfies (Dominance).
We can then focus on looking for conflict characterisations that suit the
weaker (Dominance′). In fact, we can show a rather uninteresting set C of
conflicts whose counting satisfies the property.
Proposition 7.25. Let C ⊆ K be the set of all inconsistent knowledge bases not
containing valid formulas. IC satisfies (Dominance′).
Recall from Theorems 5.10 and 5.22 that any Cn? ∈ {Cnmod, Cn} yields
the definition of ?-conflict as being inconsistent bases with no valid formu-
las. That is, for such Cn?, I? satisfies (Dominance′), which is equivalent to
the corresponding (?-Dominance). Even though we have provided a definition
of conflict that induces an inconsistency measure satisfying (Dominance′), the
characterisation looks quite loose. Hence, this does not seem to prove the case
for (Dominance′). But, it must be remarked that we are not showing that there
is no more meaningful conflict notion that could be the basis for an inconsis-
tency measure satisfying (Dominance′). Furthermore, the existence of such a
conflict definition is not a strict requirement for endorsing (Dominance′), thus
we are not thoroughly rejecting this postulate. We are just suggesting that
the whole spectrum of (?-Dominance) properties can be used to provide a more
refined description of the behaviour of inconsistency measures, in case they do
not enjoy (Dominance′).
8. Computational Complexity
The possibility of applying the introduced concepts of ?-free/innocuous for-
mula and ?-conflict to a real-world problem depends on the computational cost
with which their instances can be recognised/computed. In this section, we dis-
cuss this matter, providing computational complexity bounds for the problems
of recognising ?-free/innocuous formulas and ?-conflicts, given some assump-
tions on the corresponding consequence operation Cn?.
We focus on three decision problems: recognising whether a given ϕ ∈ L is
?-free in a given knowledge base Γ ∈ K, whether ϕ is ?-innocuous in Γ, and
whether a given knowledge base Γ is a ?-conflict. Computational complexity
bounds for these decision problems imply bounds for the corresponding tasks
of actually finding the ?-conflicts and ?-innocuous/free formulas in a knowledge
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base. Formally, these decisions problems are encoded via languages, which are
sets of strings; i.e., we are interested in the problem of deciding whether a given
input (string) is in a set (language):
Definition 8.1. Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation Cn?.
• ?-FREE is the language formed by the pairs 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ L × K such that ϕ
is ?-free in Γ.
• ?-INNOCUOUS is the language formed by the pairs 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ L×K such
that ϕ is ?-innocuous in Γ.
• ?-CONFLICT is the language formed by the knowledge bases Γ ∈ K that
are ?-conflicts.
• ?-CONSEQUENCE is the language formed by the pairs 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ L × K
such that ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ).
We denote by FREE and MIS the particular cases of ?-FREE and ?-CONFLICT,
respectively, where Cn? = CnId. The fourth language in the definition above
captures the computational complexity of the consequence operation Cn?, to
which the complexity of the other languages are clearly tied.
To classify these decision problems, we employ the standard complexity
classes P, NP, coNP, PSPACE, Σpi and Π
p
i , for i ∈ N, and the notion of com-
pleteness for a class (see for instance [5] for a computational complexity intro-
duction). As usual, PNP and NPNP are the classes of problems that are in P
or NP, respectively, if an oracle for Boolean satisfiability (SAT) is given. Ad-
ditionally, we use DP [35] to denote the class containing the languages A ∩ B
where A is a language in NP and B is a language in coNP. As these computa-
tional complexity classes relate the time/space usage to the size of the input,
we use ‖x‖ to denote the length of string x where, for any 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ L × K,
‖〈ϕ,Γ〉‖ = ‖ϕ‖+ ‖Γ‖, ‖Γ‖ = ∑
ϕ∈Γ
‖ϕ‖ and ‖ϕ‖ is the quantity of symbols (vari-
ables, connectives, parentheses) used in ϕ.
In order to obtain complexity results, some assumption on Cn? is needed.
Consider the language ?-CONFLICT. By definition, a given Γ is in ?-CONFLICT
iff there if there are a ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?Γ) and a ?-mapping f : ∆ → 2Γ. That is,
to confirm that a knowledge base Γ is a ?-conflict, we have to find such a ∆ in
Cn?(Γ). Without any restriction on the size of ∆, we cannot give any bound on
the time and space required to decide whether Γ is in ?-CONFLICT. This is due
to the fact that in principle the smallest ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) enjoying the sought-
after properties can be arbitrarily large since Cn?(Γ) can indeed be infinite. As
?-free formulas are defined through ?-conflicts, this issue inflicts the complexity
analysis of ?-FREE as well, which is equal to ?-INNOCUOUS for modular Cn?.
In order to circumvent this situation in such a way that these decisions problems
stay within the polynomial hierarchy, we impose some restrictions on Cn?:
Definition 8.2 (p-bounded). A subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? is p-bounded if there is a polynomial q : R → R such that, for every ?-
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conflict Γ ∈ K, there are a ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)), with ‖∆‖ ≤ q(‖Γ‖), and a
?-mapping f : ∆→ 2Γ.
Informally, for p-bounded consequence operations Cn?, a ?-conflict is char-
acterised as the union of the minimal sets of premises used to derive each element
in a minimal inconsistent set whose size is polynomially bounded. In the mod-
ular case, a consequence operation is p-bounded simply if every ?-conflict has a
polynomially size-bounded ?-weakening that is a minimal inconsistent set. Most
consequence operations presented here are in fact p-bounded:
Proposition 8.3. Cn, Cnmod, Cnid, Cn∧, Cn∧2 , Cn
→, CnPm and CnPm2 are
p-bounded.
Now we are ready to provide some complexity bound to ?-CONFLICT and
?-FREE, linked to a bound for the corresponding ?-CONSEQUENCE:
Proposition 8.4. Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation Cn?
that is p-bounded. If ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Σp2 ∩Πp2, or ?-CONSEQUENCE
is in Σp2 and Cn
? is modular, then ?-CONFLICT is in Σp2, and ?-FREE is in
Πp2.
Regarding space complexity, just recall that Σp2,Π
p
2 ⊆ PSPACE, thus Propo-
sition 8.4 also implies polynomial-space bounds.
When Cn? is modular, ?-FREE and ?-INNOCUOUS are the same language,
thus in the same complexity class. In the general case, however, the Cn? being
p-bounded seems not enough to put ?-INNOCUOUS in Πp2, though an extra
restriction could suffice: that for any ?-innocuous formula ϕ in Γ there is a
polynomial-sized ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) containing ϕ.
As Proposition 8.4 points out, for modular consequence operations, the re-
striction on ?-CONSEQUENCE can be slightly relaxed for the same complexity
bounds to follow. Note that even for a general Cn? the conditions imposed
on ?-CONSEQUENCE to obtain the results above are not very strong. For
instance, ?-CONSEQUENCE is coNP-complete for the classical consequence
operation Cn = Cn?, and coNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩ Πp2. In fact, that condition holds for
most consequence operations presented in this work:
Proposition 8.5. If Cn? is Cn, Cnmod, CnPm, CnPm2 , Cn
Id, Cn∧, Cn∧2 ,
Cn→ or CnPI then ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Σp2 ∩Πp2.
To have an idea of how hard it is to recognise ?-conflicts and ?-free/innocuous
formulas, we can recall the computational complexity analysis of their classical
counterparts: minimal inconsistent sets (the language MIS) and free formulas
(the language FREE). MIS is DP-complete [34], and we have that NP ⊆ DP ⊆
PNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩ Πp2 ⊆ NPNP = Σp2 [35]. That is, DP is between the first and
second levels of the polynomial hierarchy, hence deciding MIS can be regarded
as slightly less costly than deciding ?-CONFLICT, for a p-bounded Cn?. It
is worth noting that, if the polynomial hierarchy collapses in the first level
(NP = coNP), then it will follow that DP = Σp2, and deciding ?-CONFLICT, for
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a p-bounded Cn?, will be no harder than deciding MIS. It is clear that FREE
is in Πp2, as a particular case of ?-FREE, and we could find no better bound
for it. Hence, to the best of our knowledge, recognising a ?-free (?-innocuous)
formula, for a p-bounded (modular) Cn?, is theoretically as hard as verifying
if the formula is free in the knowledge base. In practice, the proof provided for
Proposition 8.4 can form the basis for naive algorithms, based on guessing and
verifying, that find ?-conflicts and ?-free formulas, although further research
should reveal more efficient methods.
9. Conclusion and Future Work
Localising inconsistency in knowledge bases is an important step towards
better managing inconsistency. Additionally, methods for both measuring and
repairing inconsistency can benefit from its localisation. Inconsistent knowledge
bases can hide conflicts that are not captured by minimal inconsistent sets. Du-
ally, some formulas regarded as free may be involved in conflicts together with
parts of other formulas. To circumvent these issues, we presented ?-innocuous
formulas and ?-conflicts — which indirectly define ?-free formulas — as alter-
native ways to localise the controversial formulas in an inconsistent knowledge
base and identify its atomic conflicts. We showed how these concepts generalise
free formulas and minimal inconsistent sets and how they relate to an underlying
consolidation procedure. We proved that, for modular consequence operations
Cn?, ?-innocuous and ?-free formula concepts are extensionally equivalent. We
also showed that allowing classical consequences (Cn? = Cn or `?= `) yields
the trivial notion of ?-conflict that encompasses all inconsistent bases without
tautologies. Applying our framework to measuring inconsistency, we introduced
new general inconsistency measures defined via ?-conflicts. We investigated the
debatable postulates of (Independence) and (Dominance), proposing a formal
method to relax them into properties parameterised by the consequence opera-
tion Cn?. In particular, we analysed the possibility of reconciling a version of
(Dominance) with an inconsistency measure based on counting conflicts.
How one define Cn? depends on the application. Though, as a general rule,
the expressivity of Cn? should reflect the degree to which those considering
the knowledge will deconstruct and/or synthase it. For instance, Santos et al.
[39] describe different scenarios in belief revision that, for the desirable results
to follow, require different subclassical consequence operations to be applied
before performing a contraction. Our framework can then be instantiated via
these consequence operations in the corresponding situations.
Dealing with inconsistency is needed in different areas, for instance in de-
scriptive logic [30] and ontologies [31]. Thus, iceberg inconsistencies may appear
in several contexts, under different formal languages. Using classical proposi-
tional logical as a prototype, we provided a general framework that can be
applied to many different formalisms, such as description logics, probabilistic
logics, mathematical constraints, etc. Wherever there is a minimal inconsis-
tent subset, there might be inconsistencies hidden under the water. Once these
submerged conflicts are spotted via a consequence operation, ?-conflicts brings
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them to the surface, localising its possible causes. Dually, ?-free formulas are
those that do not contribute to these hidden inconsistencies. If inconsistency is
to be resolved through a given formal procedure, then ?-innocuous formulas can
be safely ignored during the consolidation. In general, formalising a consistency
restoring procedure through a ?-consolidation yields, via our proposal, methods
for localising (via ?-conflicts) and measuring (via I?) inconsistency. Due to this
flexibility, the ideas we put forward can be adapted to problems in a variety of
areas, such as belief revision (see [12]), belief merging, requirements engineering,
constraints satisfaction, incoherence measuring in formal epistemology and so
on.
In requirements engineering, we can envisage that when inconsistencies are
found in sets of requirements, our techniques can be used to determine who
should be invited to discussions on resolving the inconsistencies (as suggested
by Example 3.4 and 5.6). Our results show how choices for instance for Cn?
can affect the identification of ?-conflicts, which in turn can affect how we can
identify participants to the discussions. Similarly, if we want to invoke a proce-
dure for resolving inconsistencies in the set of requirements, and at each stage,
we want to reduce the degree of inconsistency, we need to be clear about the
notion of inconsistency we are measuring, and that in turn calls for clarity over
the properties we expect of our inconsistency measure (such as whether (?-
Dominance) holds). In general, if the management of inconsistent requirements
is logic-based, as in [37], our framework might be employed to improve the data
analysis. We therefore see that with the proposals in this paper, there is a range
of conceptual tools for better managing the subtleties in iceberg inconsistencies
that arise in diverse domains of computer science.
Inconsistency management policies [32, 33] offer context-dependent mech-
anisms for managing inconsistencies. To illustrate, consider a client database
with information on salaries, and for a particular individual, there are differ-
ent tuples giving different values for the salary. Different users of the database
might require different policies for resolving the inconsistency. For example, a
tax inspector might take the maximum value as the salary, whereas a loan risk
assessor might take the lowest value. Localizing and assessing inconsistencies
is an important aspect of applying such policies, and they could be enhanced
by considering iceberg conflicts. Furthermore, as acknowledged in Martinez
et al. [32], inconsistency measures may be a useful tool for helping to decide
which inconsistency management policy to use. For instance, if an inconsistency
management policy involves weakening some of the information (represented as
formulae), it may be prudent to first check whether weakening the formulae
would actually reduce the degree of inconsistency where this measure takes into
account iceberg conflicts.
Multi-context systems [14, 10] also offer context-dependent mechanisms for
managing and resolving inconsistencies. They harness heterogeneous informa-
tion sources using bridge rules which specify how information can be pooled
from these sources. When inconsistencies arise in the pooled information, ex-
planations can be used to localize and assess them. These explanations are
subsets of the information, and in [16], an adaptation of an inconsistency mea-
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sure based on minimal inconsistent subsets is used to assess inconsistency. This
approach to assessing inconsistency can be augmented by considering iceberg
conflicts. Also in [15] these inconsistency explanations are formalised via logic,
possibly enabling the application of our framework.
For relational databases, there is a range of repair techniques for resolving
consistency [3, 7, 44, 6, 38]. These include deleting tuples, inserting null values,
and attribute-based repairs (i.e. changing attributes in tuples), and they can be
harnessed according to context using distance-based methods [4]. Depending
on the precise specification of the repair technique, consideration of iceberg
conflicts could be important in determining whether a particular approach to
repair is appropriate. The need to consider iceberg conflicts could also arise
in other options for resolving inconsistency in databases such as revising tuples
(e.g. for values in conflict, taking an interval of the values), and weakening
integrity constraints.
Future work includes exploring different forms of localising inconsistency in
knowledge bases by instantiating the framework introduced here. For instance,
the consequence operation could be defined by classical elimination rules, by
paraconsistent logics or by substructural logics. Another future task is to char-
acterise primitive conflicts via a set of rationality postulates that they should
satisfy, in the style of the AGM-operations.
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Appendix: Proofs of Technical Results
Proposition 4.2 . Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and a formula ϕ ∈ Γ. ϕ
is free in Γ iff, for any AGM-consolidation Γ′ of Γ, Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} is consistent.
Proof. (→) Suppose ϕ is free in Γ. Consider an arbitrary AGM-consolidation
Γ′ of Γ. As Γ′ ⊆ Γ is consistent, it has no MIS, and adding ϕ cannot create a
MIS, for it would be a MIS in Γ containing ϕ, which is free. Thus, Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} is
consistent.
(←) Suppose ϕ is not free in Γ. Then, there is a ∆ ∈ MIS(Γ) such that
ϕ ∈ ∆. Now consider the base Ψ = ∆ \ {ϕ}, which is consistent, and a AGM-
consolidation Γ, but Ψ ∪ {ϕ} = ∆ is inconsistent.
Proposition 4.10 . Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K→ K, a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and a ∆ ⊆ Γ that contains only formulas
that are ?-innoucuous in Γ. If Ψ′ is a ?-consolidation of Ψ = Γ\∆, then Ψ′∪∆
is a ?-consolidation of Γ.
Proof. Suppose Ψ′ is a ?-consolidation of Ψ = Γ \∆. That is, Ψ′ is a consistent
subset of Cn?(Γ \∆). Since Cn? satisfies monotonicity, Cn?(Γ \∆) ⊆ Cn?(Γ),
and Ψ′ is also a ?-consolidation of Γ. If ∆ = ∅, the result is trivial, so suppose
∆ = {ϕ1, ϕ2, . . . } — ∆ can be either finite or infinite. Now define Ψ = Ψ0. For
each ϕi ∈ ∆, define Ψi = Ψi−1∪{ϕi}. As each ϕi is ?-innocuous in Γ, if Ψi−1 is
a ?-consolidation of Γ, so is Ψi−1 ∪ {ϕi} = Ψi. As Ψ0 = Ψ′ is a ?-consolidation
of Γ, Ψi also is, for all i such that ϕi ∈ ∆.
Proposition 4.11 . Let Γ be a knowledge base in K. If a formula ϕ ∈ Γ is
?-innocuous in Γ, then ϕ is free in Γ.
Proof. It follows directly from Proposition 4.2, as Cn? is assumed to be Tarskian.
Theorem 4.13 . Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod.
Given an inconsistent Γ ∈ K, a formula ϕ ∈ Γ is ?-innocuous in Γ iff ϕ is valid.
Proof. The (←)-part is trivial, for a valid formula is consistent with any con-
sistent set, so we focus on the (→)-direction of the proof. Suppose ϕ ∈ Γ is
?-innocuous in Γ and consider a ∆ ∈ MIS(Γ). By Proposition 4.11, ϕ is free,
hence ϕ 6∈ ∆. Define ∆′ = {ψ ∨ ¬ϕ|ψ ∈ ∆}, noting that ψ ∨ ¬ϕ ∈ Cn?(ψ) for
any ψ ∈ L. To prove by contradiction, suppose ϕ is not valid. Hence, ¬ϕ is
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satisfiable, and so is ∆′ ⊆ Cn?(Γ), which is a ?-consolidation of Γ. Nevertheless,
∆′ ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent, thus ϕ is not ?-innocuous, a contradiction.
Proposition 5.4 . Consider a modular subclassical Tarskian consequence oper-
ation Cn? : K→ K. If a Γ ∈ K is a minimal inconsistent set, Γ is a ?-conflict.
Proof. Suppose Γ is a MIS. Since Cn? is monotonic, Γ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)). Just
consider the function f : Γ→ Γ as the identity function for Γ to be a ?-conflict
by definition.
Proposition 5.5 . Consider a modular subclassical Tarskian consequence op-
eration Cn? : K→ K. If a Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict, it is inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ is a ?-conflict. Thus, there is an inconsistent ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ))
and a surjective function f : ∆ → Γ such that f(ψ) `? ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆. As
Cn? is subclassical, a valuation v satisfying a ϕ ∈ Γ would satisfy any ψ ∈ ∆
such that f(ψ) = ϕ. Hence, any valuation satisfying Γ also satisfies ∆. As ∆ is
inconsistent, so must be Γ.
Lemma 5.9 . Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod.
Every finite, inconsistent Γ ∈ K that does not contain valid formulas has a
?-weakening that is a MIS.
Proof. Suppose Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} is inconsistent and contains no valid formulas.
Let y1, . . . , ym be atomic propositions not occurring in Γ and define ψi = yi ∧
m∧
j=1;j 6=i
¬yj for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m. For all 1 ≤ i ≤ m, define ϕ′i = ϕi∨
m∨
j=1;j 6=i
¬ϕj∧ψj
and note that ϕi `? ϕ′i. Note that Γ′ = {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ′m} is in Cn?(Γ) and there
is a surjective function f : Γ′ → Γ, defined as f(ϕ′i) = ϕi, such that f(ψ) `? ψ
for all ψ ∈ Γ′. Now we prove Γ′ is MIS. Consider the set Γ′j = Γ′ \ {ϕ′j} for
some 1 ≤ i ≤ m. As no ϕj ∈ Γ is valid, every ¬ϕj is satisfiable. Consequently,
for any 1 ≤ j ≤ m, ¬ϕj ∧ ψj is consistent, for ψj is consistent and formed
from different atomic propositions. By construction, ¬ϕj ∧ ψj is disjunct in
ϕ′i with i 6= j. Therefore, a valuation satisfying ¬ϕj ∧ ψj also satisfies Γ′j ,
which must be consistent, regardless of the value of 1 ≤ j ≤ m. To prove by
contradiction that Γ′ is inconsistent, suppose there is a valuation v satisfying
Γ′. As Γ is inconsistent, v(ϕi) = 0 for some 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Thus, v(ϕ′i) = 1
implies v(¬ϕj ∧ ψj) = 1 for some 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note that v(ψk) = 1 implies
v(ψk′) = 0 for all k
′ 6= k, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ m. Therefore, we finally have that v(ϕ′j) = 0,
a contradiction; thus Γ′ is a MIS.
Theorem 5.10 . Consider the modular consequence operation Cn? = Cnmod.
Any finite knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict iff it is inconsistent and it does
not contain valid formulas.
Proof. (→) Suppose Γ is a ?-conflict. By Proposition 5.5, Γ must be inconsis-
tent. Suppose ϕ ∈ Γ is valid, so any ψ ∈ Cn?({ϕ}) is valid. Nevertheless, no
MIS ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) can contain a valid formula, and any ψ in a MIS is not in
Cn?(ϕ). Thus, for any MIS ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) there can be no surjective function
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f : ∆→ Γ such that f(ψ) `? ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆. This contradicts the fact that Γ
is a ?-conflict.
(←) Direct consequence of Lemma 5.9.
Theorem 5.11 . Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and a modular Cn? : K→
K. A formula ϕ ∈ Γ is ?-innocuous in Γ iff it is in no ?-conflict of Γ.
Proof. (→) Let ϕ be ?-innocuous in Γ. Suppose there is a ?-conflict ∆ ⊆ Γ
such that ϕ ∈ ∆. Since ∆ = Ψ∪{ϕ} is a ?-conflict, it must have a ?-weakening
Ψ′∪{θ}, with ϕ `? θ, that is a MIS. Thus, Ψ′ ⊆ Cn?(Ψ) ⊆ Cn?(Γ) is consistent
and it is a ?-consolidation of Γ. Due to the fact that ϕ is ?-innocuous in Γ,
Ψ′ ∪ {ϕ} is consistent. However, since Ψ′ ∪ {θ} is inconsistent, θ ∈ Cn(ϕ)
implies that Ψ′ ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent; a contradiction.
(←) Suppose ϕ is not innocuous in Γ. Then there is a ?-consolidation Γ′ ⊆
Cn?(Γ) such that Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent. As Γ′ is consistent, there must be
a MIS ∆ ⊆ Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} such that ϕ ∈ ∆. Construct a function f : ∆ → Γ such
that f(ϕ) = ϕ and, for each ψ ∈ ∆ \ {ϕ}, make f(ψ) = θ for some θ such that
θ `? ψ. Let ∆′ be the range of f , and define a function f ′ : ∆ → ∆′ such that
f ′(ψ) = f(ψ) for all ψ ∈ ∆. As f ′ is surjective, ∆′ is a ?-conflict containing
ϕ.
Proposition 5.12 . Suppose Γ′ ∈ K is a ?-weakening of Γ ∈ K. If, for each
?-conflict ∆ ⊆ Γ, all ?-weakenings ∆′ ⊆ Γ′ of ∆ are consistent, then Γ′ is a
?-consolidation of Γ.
Proof. We prove via the contrapositive. If Γ′ is not a ?-consolidation of Γ, Γ′
is inconsistent and must contain at least one minimal inconsistent set, that we
denote by Ψ. For each θ ∈ Ψ, take a ϕ ∈ Γ such that ϕ `? θ, and let ∆ be the
set of such ϕ’s in Γ — that is, Ψ ⊆ Γ′ is a ?-weakening of ∆ ⊆ Γ. By definition,
∆ is an ?-conflict.
Proposition 5.15 . A formula ϕ is ?-innocuous in a base Γ ∈ K iff, for all
∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)), ϕ 6∈ ∆.
Proof. (→) Suppose there is a ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) such that ϕ ∈ ∆. Then,
∆ \ {ϕ} is a consistent subset of Cn?(Γ), so it is a ?-consolidation. However,
(∆ \ {ϕ}) ∪ {ϕ} = ∆ is inconsistent, so ϕ cannot be ?-innocuous.
(←) Suppose now ϕ is not ?-innocuous in Γ. Then, there is a (consistent)
?-consolidation Γ′ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) such that Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} is inconsistent. Therefore, all
minimal inconsistent subsets in ∆ = Γ′ ∪ {ϕ} must contain ϕ.
Proposition 5.17 . Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K, a minimal inconsistent
set ∆ ∈ K and a modular, subclassical, Tarskian Cn?. ∆ is a ?-weakening of Γ
iff there is a ?-mapping f : ∆→ 2Γ.
Proof. (→) Suppose ∆ is a ?-weakening of Γ, so ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) and there is
a surjective function f ′ : ∆ → Γ such that f ′(ψ) `? ψ for all ψ ∈ ∆. Consider
the function f : ∆ → 2Γ defined as f(ψ) = {f ′(ψ)}, for all ψ ∈ ∆. As f ′ is
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surjective,
⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ) = Γ. Furthermore, as ∆ is a MIS, it should contain no valid
formula, and ψ ∈ ∆ implies ψ 6∈ Cn?(∅), for Cn? is subclassical. Therefore,
Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ).
(←) Now suppose there is ?-mapping a f : ∆ → 2Γ. Hence, ⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ) = Γ
and, for all ψ ∈ ∆, ψ ∈ Cn?(f(ψ)) and Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ). As ∆ is
a MIS, it has no valid formulas, so ψ 6∈ Cn?(∅) for every ψ ∈ ∆, since Cn? is
subclassical. Furthermore, Cn? is modular and Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ),
thus f(ψ) is a singleton for every ψ ∈ ∆. Consider the function f ′ : ∆→ Γ such
that, for all ψ ∈ ∆, f ′(ψ) = ϕ, where f(ψ) = {ϕ}. Finally, since ⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ) = Γ,
f ′ is surjective and ∆ is a ?-weakening of Γ.
Proposition 5.20 . Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K→ K. If a Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict, it is inconsistent.
Proof. Suppose Γ is a ?-conflict, thus there is a MIS ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ). As Cn?
is subclassical, ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) implies ∆ ⊆ Cn(Γ). Since ∆ is inconsistent,
⊥ ∈ Cn(∆). As Cn is Tarskian, ⊥ ∈ Cn(∆) implies ⊥ ∈ Cn(Γ); therefore, Γ is
inconsistent.
Proposition 5.21 . If a knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a minimal inconsistent set,
then it is ?-conflict.
Proof. Recall that Cn? must be monotonic. Hence, Γ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)). Consider
the function f : Γ→ 2Γ such that f(ϕ) = {ϕ} for all ϕ ∈ Γ. f is such that for all
ψ ∈ Γ, ψ ∈ Cn?(f(ψ)) = Cn?({ψ}) and Ψ ( f(ψ) = {ψ} implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ),
because ψ is not valid (ψ /∈ Cn?(∅) ⊆ Cn(∅)). Therefore, f is a ?-mapping
and Γ is a ?-conflict.
Theorem 5.22 . Consider the consequence operation Cn? = Cn. Any finite
knowledge base Γ ∈ K is a ?-conflict iff it is inconsistent and it does not contain
valid formulas.
Proof. (→) Suppose Γ is a ?-conflict. By Proposition 5.20, Γ must be inconsis-
tent. Suppose a ϕ ∈ Γ is valid. There must be a ∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?Γ) and a function
f : ∆ → 2Γ such that ⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ) = Γ and, for all ψ ∈ ∆, ψ ∈ Cn?(f(ψ)) and
Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ). Hence, there is a ψ ∈ ∆ such that ϕ ∈ f(ψ).
Nevertheless, Cn(Ψ \ {ϕ}) = Cn(Ψ), for ϕ is valid; a contradiction.
(←) Now suppose Γ is inconsistent and it does not contain valid formulas.
By Lemma 5.9, if Cn? = Cnmod, Γ has a ?-weakening ∆ that is a MIS. Hence
∆ ∈ MIS(Cnmod(Γ)) ⊆ Cn(Γ) and, by Proposition 5.17, there is a ?-mapping
f : ∆ → 2Γ (for Cn? = Cnmod). For any ψ ∈ ∆, Cnmod(f(ψ)) ⊆ Cn(f(ψ)).
Additionally, since Cnmod is modular, f(ψ) is a singleton for each ψ ∈ ∆, and
Ψ ( f(ψ) implies Ψ = ∅. Therefore, Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn(Ψ) = Cn(∅),
as ψ is non-valid, for any ψ ∈ ∆. Thus, f : ∆ → 2Γ is also a ?-mapping for
Cn? = Cn and Γ is a ?-conflict for Cn? = Cn.
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Corollary 5.25 . If a formula ϕ is ?-free in a base Γ ∈ K, then ϕ is free in Γ.
Proof. Direct consequence of Proposition 5.21.
Corollary 5.26 . Consider a modular consequence operation Cn?. A formula
ϕ is ?-free in a base Γ ∈ K iff ϕ is ?-innocuous in Γ.
Proof. Direct consequence of Theorem 5.11.
Proposition 5.27 . If a formula ϕ is ?-free in Γ ∈ K, then ϕ is ?-innocuous
in Γ.
Proof. Suppose ϕ is not ?-innocuous in Γ. By Proposition 5.15, there must be
a minimal inconsistent subset ∆ ⊆ Cn?(Γ) that contains ϕ. Consequently, ϕ is
not valid and ϕ 6∈ Cn?(∅), for Cn? is subclassical. Define a function f : ∆→ 2Γ
in the following way: f(ϕ) = {ϕ} and, for each ψ ∈ ∆ \ {ϕ}, f(ψ) = Ψ for a
minimal Ψ ⊆ Γ such that ψ ∈ Cn?(Ψ). Define ∆′ = ⋃
ψ∈∆
f(ψ). Note that
g : ∆ → 2∆′ , defined as g(ψ) = f(ψ) for all ψ ∈ ∆, is a ?-mapping. Hence, ∆′
is a ?-conflict, ϕ ∈ ∆′ is not ?-free.
Proposition 6.6 . Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPI and a
knowledge base Γ ∈ K. If Γ is a DMIS-conflict, then Γ is a ?-conflict.
Proof. Suppose that Γ is a DMIS-conflict. Hence, there is a DMIS 〈Γ,∆〉. Just
note that the MIS ∆ is a ?-weakening of Γ, thus, by Proposition 5.17, Γ is a
?-conflict.
Proposition 6.11 . Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPm . If a
knowledge base Γ ∈ K is an opposite-literals conflict, then it is a ?-conflict.
Proof. Suppose Γ ∈ K is an opposite-literals conflict. Then, there are ∆,∆′ ⊆ Γ
and a literal y such that ∆ and ∆′ are minimal proofs of y and ¬y, respectively,
and Γ = ∆∪∆′. Hence, {y,¬y} ∈ Cn?(Γ). Define f : {y,¬y} → 2Γ as f(y) = ∆
and f(¬y) = ∆′. Since ∆ and ∆′ are minimal proofs of y and ¬y, f is such that
Ψ ( f(y) = ∆ (Ψ′ ( f(¬y) = ∆′) implies y /∈ Cn?(Ψ) (¬y /∈ Cn?(Ψ′)). Finally,
for
⋃
ψ∈{y,¬y}
f(ψ) = ∆ ∪∆′ = Γ, f is a ?-mapping and Γ is a ?-conflict.
Proposition 6.13 . Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnPm2 . If a
knowledge base Γ ∈ K is an opposite-literals conflict, then it is a ?-conflict.
Proof. Suppose Γ ∈ K is an opposite-literals conflict. Then, there are ∆,∆′ ⊆
Γ and a y ∈ Lit(∆) such that ∆ and ∆′ are minimal proofs of y and ¬y,
respectively, and Γ = ∆ ∪ ∆′. The remaining is the same as the proof of
Proposition 6.11.
Proposition 7.4 . Consider a subclassical Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K→ K. I? and I?C satisfy (Consistency) and (Monotonicity).
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Proof. (Monotonicity) holds trivially, for the fact that the ?-conflicts in a Γ ∈ K
are also present in any knowledge base ∆ ⊇ Γ. To see that (Consistency) holds,
note that any ?-conflict is inconsistent, by Proposition 5.20, thus a consistent
Γ ∈ K must contain no ?-conflict and I?(Γ) = I?C (Γ) = 0. Conversely, if Γ ∈ K
is inconsistent, it must contain at least a MIS ∆ ⊆ Γ. By Proposition 5.21, ∆
is also a ?-conflict and I?(Γ), I?C (Γ) ≥> 0.
Proposition 7.6 . Consider a subclassical Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K → K. I? and I?C satisfy (Super-additivity), (Penalty) and (Atten-
uation). (Equal-conflict) is satisfied by I?C and violated by I?.
Proof. • (Super-additivity): Consider Γ,∆ ∈ K with Γ ∩ ∆ = ∅. Note
that any I ∈ {I?, I?C} is such that I(Γ ∪ ∆) =
∑{I(Ψ) | Ψ ⊆ Γ ∪
∆ is a ? -conflict}. As each ?-conflict in either Γ or ∆ are also in Γ ∪∆,
I(Γ ∪∆) ≥ I(Γ) + I(∆).
• (Penalty): Consider a Γ ∈ K and a ϕ ∈ Γ such that ϕ is not free in Γ.
Hence, there is a ∆ ∈ MIS(Γ) such that ϕ ∈ Γ. By Proposition 5.4, ∆ is
a ?-conflict. Therefore, the set of ?-conflicts in Γ \ {ϕ} is strictly included
in the set of ?-conflicts in Γ, and I(Γ \ {ϕ}) < I(Γ) for any I ∈ {I?.
• (Attenuation) and (Equal-conflict): Consider a Γ ∈ K with ∆1,∆2 ∈
MIS(Γ). By Proposition 5.4, ∆1 and ∆2 are ?-conflicts. As every proper
subset of ∆1 or ∆2 is consistent, it is not a ?-conflict, by Proposition
5.20. Therefore, ∆i is the only ?-conflict in ∆i, yielding I?(∆i) = 1 and
I?C = 1/|∆i|, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Consequently, (Attenuation) holds for I?
and I?C , and the latter also enjoys (Equal-conflict). To see that (Equal-
conflict) is violated by I?, note that I?(∆1) = 1 = I?(∆2) even when
|∆1| < |∆2|.
Proposition 7.9 . Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? : K→ K. I? and I?C satisfy (?-Independence).
Proof. It follows direct from the definition of the measures and the property.
Proposition 7.11 . Consider the consequence operation Cn? = CnDalal. IsumDalal
and ImaxDalal satisfy (?-Independence).
Proof. Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K, let ϕ ∈ Γ be ?-free in Γ and define
∆ = Γ \ {ϕ}. One can note that IsumDalal and ImaxDalal satisfy (Monotonicity), so
IsumDalal(Γ) ≥ IsumDalal(∆) and ImaxDalal(Γ) ≥ ImaxDalal(∆). For each ψi ∈ ∆, let ψjii be
a formula such that [[ψjii ]] = {v ∈ V |D(v, [[ψi]]) ≤ ji}. If IsumDalal(∆) = ∞ or
ImaxDalal(∆) = ∞, the corresponding results follow trivially, so we focus on the
finite case. Consider the enumeration ∆ = {ψ1, ψ2, . . . }. If IsumDalal(∆) = k (or
ImaxDalal(∆) = k), then, each ψi ∈ ∆ can be weakened to a ψjii in such a way that∑{ji|ψi ∈ ∆} = k (max{ji|ψi ∈ ∆} = k) and ∆′ = {ψjii |ψi ∈ ∆} is consistent.
As Cn? is modular and ϕ is ?-free, ψ is also ?-innocuous, by Theorem 5.11.
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Since ∆′ ⊆ Cn?(∆) ⊆ Cn?(Γ), ∆′ is a ?-consolidation of both ∆ and Γ, and
Γ′ = ∆′ ∪ {ϕ} must be consistent. Hence, there is valuation v : L → {0, 1}
satisfying ∆′ such that v(ϕ) = 1. Note that
∑{D(v, [[ψi]])|ψi ∈ ∆} = k
(max{D(v, [[ψi]])|ψi ∈ ∆} = k) and D(v, [[ϕ]]) = 0. Finally,
∑{D(v, [[θ]])|θ ∈
Γ} = k and IsumDalal(∆) = k (max{D(v, [[θ]])|θ ∈ Γ} = k and ImaxDalal(∆) = k).
Proposition 7.13 . If either Cn? = CnPm or Cn? = CnPm2 , then IPm satisfies
(?-Independence).
Proof. Suppose Cn? = CnPm or Cn? = CnPm2 . Consider a knowledge base
Γ ∈ K, consider a ?-free ϕ in Γ and define ∆ = Γ \ {ϕ}. One can note that
IPm satisfy (Monotonicity), so IPm(Γ) ≥ IPm(∆). If IPm(∆) = ∞ the result
follows trivially, so we focus on the finite case. To prove by contradiction,
suppose IPm(Γ) > IPm(∆). Then, there must be some literal y such that there
is minimal proof piy ⊆ Γ of y and a minimal proof pi¬y ⊆ Γ of ¬y such that
ϕ ∈ piy∪pi¬y. Therefore, piy∪pi¬y is an opposite-literals conflict. By Propositions
6.11 and 6.13, piy ∪ pi¬y is a ?-conflict, contradicting the fact that ϕ ∈ piy ∪ pi¬y
is ?-free.
Corollary 7.15 . If Cn? is a modular, subclassical, Tarskian consequence op-
eration, (?-Independence) and (?-Independence’) are equivalent.
Proof. Direct consequence of Corollary 5.26.
Proposition 7.16 . Let I : K→ [0,∞)∪{∞} be an inconsistency measure that
satisfies (Monotonicity) and (Dominance) and consider a Γ ∈ K. If a ψ ∈ L is
such that ψ ∈ Cn(ϕ) for some consistent ϕ ∈ Γ, then I(Γ) = I(Γ ∪ {ψ}).
Proof. By (Monotonicity), I(Γ) ≤ I(Γ ∪ {ψ}). By (Dominance), I(Γ) ≥ I(Γ ∪
{ψ}), as Γ = Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
Proposition 7.21 . Consider a modular, subclassical, Tarskian consequence
operation Cn? : K→ K. I? and I?C satisfy (?-Dominance).
Proof. Consider a base Γ ∈ K and suppose there are formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L \ Γ
such that ψ ∈ Cn?({ϕ}). We prove that Γ ∪ {ϕ} has at least the same number
of ?-conflicts of size k as Γ ∪ {ϕ} for any positive k ∈ N — this would imply
I(Γ∪{ϕ}) ≥ I(Γ∪{ψ}) for any I ∈ {I?, I?C}. Let ∆ be a ?-conflict in Γ∪{ψ}.
There are two cases to consider: ψ ∈ ∆ and ψ /∈ ∆. If ψ /∈ ∆, then ∆ ⊆ Γ and
∆ ⊆ Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Thus, we focus on an arbitrary ?-conflict ∆ ⊆ Γ ∪ {ψ} such that
ψ ∈ ∆. We prove that ∆′ = (∆\{ψ})∪{ϕ} is a ?-conflict in Γ∪{ϕ}, noting that
|∆| = |∆′|. Since ∆ is a ?-conflict, it has a ?-weakening Ψ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ∪{ψ}))
and there exists a surjective function f : Ψ → ∆ such that f(θ) `? θ for
all θ ∈ Ψ. As Cn? satisfies inclusion and monotonicity, Γ ⊆ Cn?(Γ ∪ {ϕ}),
and as ψ ∈ Cn?({ϕ}), monotonicity implies Γ ∪ {ψ} ⊆ Cn?(Γ ∪ {ϕ}). Due
to monotonicity and idempotence, Cn?(Γ ∪ {ψ}) ⊆ Cn?(Γ ∪ {ϕ}). Hence,
Ψ ⊆ Cn?(Γ ∪ {ϕ}). Consider the function f ′ : Ψ→ ∆′ defined as f ′(θ) = f(θ)
if f(θ) 6= ψ, otherwise f(θ) = ϕ, for all θ ∈ Ψ. As f is surjective on ∆,
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so is f ′ on ∆′. Since Cn? satisfies monotonicity and idempotence, f(θ) = ψ
implies θ ∈ Cn?({ψ}) ⊆ Cn?({ϕ}). Hence, f ′(θ) `? θ for all θ ∈ Ψ. Therefore,
Ψ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ ∪ {ϕ})) is a ?-weakening of ∆′ ⊆ Γ ∪ {ϕ}, and the latter
is a ?-conflict. Note that, if ∆1 and ∆2 are different ?-conflicts of Γ ∪ {ψ},
∆′1 = (∆1 \ {ψ}) ∪ {ϕ} and ∆′2 = (∆1 \ {ψ}) ∪ {ϕ} are different ?-conflicts of
Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Consequently, each ?-conflict ∆ in Γ ∪ {ψ} corresponds to a different
?-conflict ∆′ of Γ ∪ {ϕ} such that |∆| = |∆′|, finishing the proof.
Proposition 7.22 . Let Cn? : K → K be a modular, subclassical, Tarskian
consequence operator. IMIS satisfies (?-Dominance) iff ϕ `? ψ implies ϕ and
ψ are equivalent for all consistent, non-valid ϕ,ψ ∈ L.
Proof. (→) To prove via the contrapositive, suppose there are consistent, non-
valid ϕ,ψ ∈ L such that ϕ `? ψ but ϕ and ψ are not equivalent. As Cn? is
subclassical, ϕ `? ψ implies ϕ ` ψ, thus ψ 6` ϕ. Consider the knowledge base
Γ = {¬ϕ,ψ → ϕ,ψ → ϕ∧>}. Note that {¬ϕ,ϕ} is the only MIS in Γ∪{ϕ} but
Γ∪{ψ} contains two MISes, {¬ϕ,ψ → ϕ,ψ}, {¬ϕ,ψ → ϕ∧>, ψ}, since {¬ϕ,ψ}
is consistent, for ψ 6` ϕ. Therefore, IMIS(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) = 1 < 2 = IMIS(Γ ∪ {ψ}),
violating (?-Dominance).
(←) Now suppose Cn? is such that ϕ `? ψ implies ϕ and ψ are equivalent
for all consistent, non-valid ϕ,ψ ∈ L. Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and
two formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L \ Γ such that ϕ `? ψ and ϕ 6` ⊥. We prove that each
MIS in Γ ∪ {ψ} corresponds to a different MIS in Γ ∪ {ψ}. Let ∆ be a MIS in
Γ ∪ {ψ}. There are two cases to consider: ψ ∈ ∆ and ψ /∈ ∆. If ψ /∈ ∆, then
∆ ⊆ Γ and ∆ ⊆ Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Thus, we suppose that ψ ∈ ∆. As ψ is in a MIS, it is
not valid, thus neither is ϕ, since Cn? is subclassical. As ϕ is consistent, so is
ψ, for Cn? is subclassical. Hence, by supposition, ϕ and ψ are equivalent, and
∆′ = (∆ \ {ψ}) ∪ {ϕ} is a MIS in Γ ∪ {ϕ}.
Proposition 7.23 . Let C be a set of inconsistent knowledge bases such that
MIS(L) ⊆ C. IC does not satisfy (Dominance).
Proof. Consider the inconsistent knowledge base Γ = {x1,¬x1} in K and the
formulas ϕ = x1 and ψ = x1 ∧ x1. For any C, IC(Γ) = 1, for Γ contain only
one inconsistent subset (itself) and it is a MIS. Note that Γ ∪ {ψ} contains
two MISes, Γ and {¬x1, x1 ∧ x1}, thus IC(Γ ∪ {ψ}) ≥ 2. As Γ ∪ {ϕ} = Γ,
IC(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) < IC(Γ ∪ {ψ}), violating (Dominance).
Corollary 7.24 . There is no subclassical Tarskian consequence operation Cn? :
K→ K such that I? satisfies (Dominance).
Proof. Direct consequence of Proposition 7.23 and Proposition 5.21.
Proposition 7.25 . Let C ⊆ K be the set of all inconsistent knowledge bases
not containing valid formulas. IC satisfies (Dominance′).
Proof. Consider a knowledge base Γ ∈ K and two formulas ϕ,ψ ∈ L \ Γ such
that ϕ ` ψ and ϕ 6` ⊥. We prove that each ∆ ⊆ (Γ ∪ {ψ}) in C corresponds to
a different ∆′ ⊆ (Γ ∪ {ϕ}) in C. Let ∆ ∈ C be a subset of Γ ∪ {ψ}. There are
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two cases to consider: ψ ∈ ∆ and ψ /∈ ∆. If ψ /∈ ∆, then ∆ ⊆ Γ and ∆ ⊆ Γ and
∆ ⊆ Γ ∪ {ϕ}. Thus, we focus on an arbitrary ∆ ⊆ Γ ∪ {ψ} such that ψ ∈ ∆.
As ∆ ∈ C, it is inconsistent and contains no valid formulas. Since ψ is in a
∆, it is not valid, and neither is ϕ, for ϕ ` ψ. Hence, ∆′ = (∆ \ {ψ}) ∪ {ϕ}
contains no valid formulas. Furthermore, as ϕ ` ψ, ∆′ is also inconsistent and
in C. Finally, Γ ∪ {ϕ} has at least the same number of subsets in C as Γ ∪ {ψ}
has, IC(Γ ∪ {ϕ}) ≥ IC(Γ ∪ {ψ}) and (Dominance′) is satisfied.
Proposition 8.3 . Cn, Cnmod, Cnid, Cn∧, Cn∧2 , Cn
→, CnPm and CnPm2 are
p-bounded.
Proof. In the case of Cn? ∈ {Cnid, Cn∧, Cn∧2 , Cn→}, note that, for any Γ ∈ K,
‖Cn?(Γ)‖ = ‖Γ‖, ‖Cn?(Γ)‖ ≤ ‖Γ‖2, ‖Cn?(Γ)‖ ≤ 2‖Γ‖ and ‖Cn?(Γ)‖ ≤ (‖Γ‖+
1)2 (see proof of Proposition 8.5), respectively. When Cn? ∈ {CnPm, CnPm2 },
∆ ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) implies ∆ = {xi,¬xi} for some atomic proposition xi, so ‖∆‖
would actually be constant. Consider now that Cn? ∈ {Cn,Cnmod}. Using
Theorems 5.10 and 5.22, a given ?-conflict Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} is inconsistent
with no valid formulas. In the proof of Lemma 5.9, a minimal inconsistent
set Γ′ = {ϕ′1, . . . , ϕ′m} is provided as a ?-weakening (for Cn? = Cnmod) for Γ.
Hence, Γ′ ∈ MIS(Cnmod(Γ)) ⊆ MIS(Cn(Γ)) and, by Proposition 5.17, there is a
?-mapping f : Γ′ → 2Γ (for Cn? = Cnmod), such that ⋃
ϕ∈Γ′
f(ϕ) = Γ and ψ ∈ Γ′,
ψ ∈ Cnmod(f(ψ)) ⊆ Cn(f(ψ)) and Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn?(Ψ) ⊆ Cn(Ψ) .
As Cnmod is modular, each f(ψ) is a singleton, and Ψ ( f(ψ) implies Ψ = ∅.
Thus, Ψ ( f(ψ) implies ψ /∈ Cn(Ψ) for any ψ ∈ Γ′. Thus, f is a ?-mapping
also for Cn? = Cn. Finally, because ‖Γ′‖ is polynomial in ‖Γ‖, by construction,
both Cn and Cnmod are p-bound.
Proposition 8.4 . Consider a subclassical, Tarskian consequence operation
Cn? that is p-bounded. If ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Σp2∩Πp2, or ?-CONSEQUENCE
is in Σp2 and Cn
? is modular, then ?-CONFLICT is in Σp2, and ?-FREE is in
Πp2.
Proof. ?-CONFLICT, General case. Our proof for ?-CONFLICT employs
polynomial reductions to the satisfiability of quantified Boolean formula with
two alternations of quantifiers (∃x1, . . . , xn,∀xn+1, . . . , xmϕ, ϕ ∈ L), Σ2SAT
(see e.g. [5]), which is Σp2-complete. Suppose ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Σ
p
2 ∩Πp2.
As ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Σp2, it can be polynomially reduced, via a func-
tion fΣ, to Σ2SAT. Similarly, as ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Π
p
2, its complement,
NOT-?-CONSEQUENCE, can also be polynomially reduced, via a function fΠ,
to Σ2SAT. Thus, for a given 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ L × K, there are quantified Boolean
formulas fΣ(ϕ,Γ) and fΠ(ϕ,Γ) (in the form ∃x1, . . . , xn,∀xn+1, . . . , xn′θ), with
‖fΣ(ϕ,Γ)‖, ‖fΨ(ϕ,Γ)‖ being polynomial in ‖〈ϕ,Γ〉‖, such that ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ) iff
fΣ(ϕ,Γ) ∈ Σ2SAT and ϕ /∈ Cn?(Γ) iff fΠ(ϕ,Γ) ∈ Σ2SAT. As Cn? is p-bounded,
there is a polynomial q such that a given Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} is in ?-CONFLICT
iff there are a ∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψk} ∈ MIS(Cn?Γ), with ‖∆‖ ≤ q(‖Γ‖), and a ?-
mapping f : ∆→ 2Γ. There exists a ?-mapping f : ∆→ 2Γ iff there are subsets
57
Γ1, . . . ,Γk ⊆ Γ such that ∪kj=1Γj = Γ and, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k, ψj ∈ Cn?(Γj) and
Γ′j ⊆ Γj implies ψj /∈ Cn?(Γ). The idea is to encode these conditions using fΣ
and fΠ, then deciding if the resulting formulas are in Σ2SAT by guessing truth
values for ∃-bound variables and calling a SAT-oracle. Note that a given quan-
tified Boolean formula ∃x1, . . . , xn,∀xn+1, . . . , xn′θ(x1, . . . , xn′) is true if there
are y1, . . . , yn ∈ {>,⊥}n such that ∀xn+1, . . . , xn′θ(y1, . . . , yn, xn+1, . . . , xn′) is
true (θ(y1, . . . , yn, xn+1, . . . , xn′) is a propositional tautology). Assume we have
an oracle to Boolean satisfiability (SAT), which also recognises a tautology ϕ,
for ¬ϕ would be unsatisfiable. A given Γ is a ?-conflict iff we can guess a
∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψk} ∈ K, subsets Γ1, . . . ,Γk ⊆ Γ with ∪kj=1Γj = Γ, and the truth
values for ∃-bound variables in fΣ(ψj ,Γj) and in fΠ(ψj ,Γj \ {ϕji}), for each
1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γj |, and then verify, using the SAT-oracle, that ∆ is
a minimal inconsistent set (∆ is unsatisfiable and each ∆ \ {ψj} is satisfiable),
fΣ(ψj ,Γj) and in fΠ(ψj ,Γj\{ϕji}) are true, for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k and 1 ≤ i ≤ |Γj |.
Note that ∆ and each Γj have all polynomial size on ‖Γ‖. Furthermore, each
fΣ(ψj ,Γj) and each fΠ(ψj ,Γj \ {ϕji}) can be computed in polynomial time.
Hence, ?-CONFLICT is in NPNP = Σp2.
?-CONFLICT, Modular case. Suppose now Cn? is modular and ?-
CONSEQUENCE is in Σp2. As Cn
? is p-bounded, there is a polynomial q such
that a given Γ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm} is in ?-CONFLICT iff it has a ?-weakening
∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψk} ∈ MIS(Cn?(Γ)) satisfying ‖∆‖ ≤ q(‖Γ‖). ∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψk}
is a ?-weakening of Γ iff we can guess an onto function g : ∆ → Γ such that,
for each ψj ∈ ∆, g(ψj) `? ψj (ψj ∈ Cn?({g(ψj)})). Again, this consequence
relation can be encoded via fΣ. Hence, Γ is a ?-conflict iff we can guess a
∆ = {ψ1, . . . , ψk} ∈ K, an onto function g : ∆ → Γ and the truth values for
∃-bound variables in fΣ(ψj , g(ψj)) for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k and then verify, using
the SAT-oracle, that ∆ is a minimal inconsistent set and fΣ(ψj , g(ψj)) is true,
for each 1 ≤ j ≤ k. Note that an onto function g : ∆ → Γ can be encoded in
polynomial size in ‖Γ‖ and ‖∆‖ ≤ q(‖Γ‖). Hence, as in the case for general
Cn?, we can conclude that ?-CONFLICT is in Σp2.
?-FREE, Both cases.To see that ?-FREE is in Πp2, in both cases (modular
and general Cn?, with ?-CONSEQUENCE respectively in Σp2 and in Σ
p
2 ∩Πp2),
consider the problem of verifying whether a given ϕ ∈ L is not ?-free in a given
Γ′ ∈ K. Just add the guessing of a Γ ⊂ Γ′, with ϕ ∈ Γ, to the corresponding
procedure above (modular or general Cn?) and repeat the other steps to verify
whether this Γ is a ?-conflict. Note that this extra guessing has polynomial size,
since ‖Γ‖ ≤ ‖Γ′‖. Therefore, checking that a formula is not ?-free is also in Σp2,
and ?-FREE is in Πp2.
Proposition 8.5 . If Cn? is Cn, Cnmod, CnPm, CnPm2 , Cn
Id, Cn∧, Cn∧2 ,
Cn→ or CnPI then ?-CONSEQUENCE is in Σp2 ∩Πp2.
Proof. Consider a given pair 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ L×K. For Cn? = Cn, ?-CONSEQUENCE
is in coNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩ Πp2, as ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ) iff Γ ∪ {¬ϕ} is unsatisfiable. Hence, for
Cn? = Cnmod, to decide whether 〈ϕ,Γ〉 is in ?-CONSEQUENCE, one can
check whether ψ ∈ Cn({ϕ}) for each ϕ ∈ Γ, and ?-CONSEQUENCE is in
PNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩Πp2.
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Since CnPm(Γ) = {ψ ∈ Cn(Γ) | ψ is a literal} and CnPm2 (Γ) = {ψ ∈
Cn(Γ) | ψ ∈ Lit(Γ)}, for Cn? ∈ {CnPm, CnPm2 }, deciding whether 〈ϕ,Γ〉 ∈ ?-
CONSEQUENCE can be done via deciding whether ϕ ∈ Cn(Γ), employing an
SAT-oracle (see proof of Proposition 8.4), and whether ϕ is a literal (in Γ),
which can be done in polynomial time. Therefore ?-CONSEQUENCE is in
PNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩Πp2 is this case as well.
For Cn? ∈ {CnId, Cn∧, Cn∧2 }, it is clear that ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ) can be verified in
a polynomial number of steps, thus ?-CONSEQUENCE is in P ⊆ Σp2 ∩Πp2.
Now consider Cn? = Cn→. Let f→ : K → K be defined as f→(∆) =
∆∪{ψ | θ, θ → ψ ∈ Cn∧(∆)} for any ∆ ∈ K. Note that f→ can be computed in
polynomial time. For any positive n ∈ N, let fn→ denote the n-th iterated of f→
(for instance, f3→(∆) = f→(f→(f→(∆)))). Note that ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ) iff there is an
n ∈ N such that ϕ ∈ fn→(Γ). As the number of connectives → in Γ is limited by
‖Γ‖, Cn?(Γ) = f‖Γ‖→ (Γ). Thus, ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ) iff ϕ ∈ f‖Γ‖→ (Γ). By construction,
‖fn→(∆)‖ ≤ (n+ 1)‖∆‖, for any ∆ ∈ K and positive n ∈ N. Therefore, one can
compute f‖Γ‖→ (Γ) = Cn
?(Γ) and check whether ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ) in polynomial time
in ‖Γ‖, and ?-CONSEQUENCE is in P ⊆ Σp2 ∩Πp2.
If Cn? = CnPI , then ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ) iff ϕ is a prime implicate of some ψ ∈ Γ.
Hence, to decide whether ϕ ∈ Cn?(Γ), after verifying in polynomial time that
ϕ is a clause, one can check, for each ψ ∈ Γ, if the following conditions hold: (i)
ψ ` ϕ); (ii) if θ is a clause in Cn({ψ}) and θ ` ϕ, then ϕ and θ are equivalent.
Condition (i) can be checked with a single call to a SAT-oracle. To check
condition (ii), it suffices to test the clauses θ formed by discarding a disjunct
from ϕ, ensuring they are not in Cn({ϕ}). Hence, as deciding ψ ` θ takes
one call to a SAT-oracle and there are linear number of θ to be tested for each
ψ ∈ Γ, conditions (i) and (ii) take a polynomial number of SAT-oracle calls for
each ψ ∈ Γ. Therefore, with a SAT-oracle, we can decide ?-CONSEQUENCE
in polynomial time, and ?-CONSEQUENCE is in PNP ⊆ Σp2 ∩Πp2.
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